

Sociological Evaluations of various Social Transformation

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CHAPTER I

Debates On The Sociology Of Turkish Modernization

Erdi AKSAKAL¹

Introduction

Turkish modernization is too political but not social enough. Therefore, modernization is a political project and an intellectual movement. Therefore, modernization has quite different meanings from modernity. In fact, modernity and modernization are clearly separated in Eisenstadt's definition of modernity, but Eisenstadt states that the definition belongs to modernity. According to this definition, modernity is accepted as a product of social, political and economic change in Western Europe and North America from the seventeenth century to the nineteenth century, and then it is stated to be the name of the process that spread to other European countries and South American, Asian and African countries (Eisenstadt, 2014:

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11). However, modernity is a process of development towards political and economic systems that emerged in North America and Western Europe from the 17th century onwards, while modernization is an attempt to spread this process to other European, Asian and African continents. As a result, modernization is a product of different historical conditions, with a separate sphere of reality from modernity. Modernity, derived from the Latin word *modernus*, is the name of a rupture and is a Western phenomenon. Modernity corresponds to the process from the theological stage to the positivist stage in Comte, from military society to industrial society in Spencer, and from mechanical solidarity to organic solidarity in Durkheim. Modernity is the name of a rupture and a western phenomenon. However, modernization corresponds to a certain way of relating to modernity (Dellaloğlu, 2021: 55). This also corresponds to a process of cultural indigestion and manifests itself as a political project. Modernity is used to refer to a period or an approach influenced by social, cultural, artistic and scientific developments. Modernity emphasizes moving away from traditional values and methods, encouraging innovative thinking and technological progress. Modernization, on the other hand, refers to the process of moving away from all traditional and past values and adapting to western norms and standards that it considers more contemporary. Based on this distinction and difference, Turkish modernization is generally evaluated within the framework of a non-western modernity and read within the debates on local, alternative and plural modernization. It is possible to say that engineers or administrators in general played an important role in this kind of modernization. Consequently, for the understanding that starts Turkish modernization with the late Ottoman period, the steps taken towards the modernization of the army, while naming the modernization goal in question as the modernization of the army, also paves the way for discussions on a militarized modernization. Naturally, the Ottoman modernization process should be perceived as a militaristic process in general and both the Ottoman and Turkish experience should be explained as a politically elitist modernization.

This modernization, which is needed by the state, gains meaning as a bureaucratic intellectual movement and reaches a superstructural and hierarchical character. Moreover, Turkish modernization is shaped around the goal of being worldly. Because, like the West, which sees the way to understand oneself as understanding the world, it is considered an important goal and project for Turkey, a country of modernization, to achieve modernity and even to become worldly. Turkey is a country of modernization and modernization is the country's realization that it is not modern (Dellaloğlu, 2021: 50). Because modernity belongs to the West and emerged with the West's own internal dynamics and social and class contribution. Modernization in countries like Turkey, on the other hand, is understood as a project with the acceptance of not being modern and worldly. Modernity is a process that moves from the social to the political, but Turkish modernization is an effort that spreads from the political sphere to the social. The fact that modernization in Turkey is seen as sterile is mostly related to the fact that the carriers come from the bureaucratic wing (Dellaloğlu, 2017: 167)

What is Modernity?

Modernity is used to refer to a period or an approach influenced by social, cultural, artistic and scientific developments. Modernity emphasizes moving away from traditional values and methods, encouraging innovative thinking and technological progress. The concept, also referred to as economic, political and cultural change, corresponds to a western process. This process manifested itself especially in Western Europe starting from the 17th century and then spread to other countries (Eisenstadt, 2014: 11). In addition to carrying the meanings of "now" and "ascent", it emphasizes the new and makes it clear that it is a departure from the old. Modernity is a process of rebellion and change, a transition from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft, from societies of mechanical solidarity to societies of organic solidarity. It is also a change from community to society. It is the end of structural homogeneity, the end of traditional society characteristics based on agriculture, the

establishment of bureaucracy and the increase in individualization. Or it is the transformation from a structure in which individual similarities are determinant to a structure in which the division of labor is effective. At this stage, similarities change towards differentiation and collectivism towards individualism. Modernity is defined as a condition of social existence that is significantly different from all past forms of human experience and includes many aspects such as the transition from one state to another, secularism, the primacy of reason and science, and anthropocentrism. Modernity is also the name of deep upheavals and social, cultural and economic transformations in Western Europe. Modernity corresponds to the process from the theological stage to the positivist stage in Comte, from military society to industrial society in Spencer, and from mechanical solidarity to organic solidarity in Durkheim. According to Durkheim, traditional societies exhibited a mechanical form of solidarity because the individual was directly linked to the "collective conscience" rather than to a series of intermediary institutional nodes. Without the possibility of being authors of their own agency, individuals were effectively inorganic matter, hence Durkheim's mechanistic metaphor. Alternatively, industrialization promoted the specialization of tasks resulting in institutional differentiation with a more complex division of labour. As the integrative moral code of tradition was replaced by an instrumental approach to social interaction based on institutionalized specialization, individuals began to understand their social existence in terms of anomie. Durkheim argued that the new form of solidarity gained its strength by encouraging the development of individual personality, a requirement of the complex division of labor, as opposed to the mechanistic type of traditional communities. Since both the parts and the whole were "alive", modern society exhibited an "organic" form of solidarity (Durkheim 2006 :124, 131). In general terms, modernity corresponds to the process from the theological stage to the positivist stage in Comte, from military society to industrial society in Spencer, and from mechanical solidarity to organic solidarity in Durkheim.

Although modernity was influenced by the Scientific Revolution of the 17th century and the Enlightenment thought of the 17th century, its preparatory phase can be traced back to the Renaissance and Reformation. However, especially the Enlightenment period and its philosophy coincides with an important stage in terms of the conditions for the emergence of modernity. This is because the idea of modernity began to take shape in the 18th century and initiated a transformation around the triad of the individual, reason and progress. Shaped by the principle of the absolute supremacy of reason and the individual, the period allowed for an understanding in which the real would be defined according to reason with the rationalist philosophies of names such as Bacon, Spinoza, Diderot, Descartes and Kant. The removal of metaphysics from the circle of the sacred and its placement on the worldly plane now leads to the understanding that the social order is a product of the human-rational will. From now on, the individual is what is natural and society is accepted as an artificial reality. The acceptance that the individual is what is natural and the analysis that society is an artificial reality constructed by individuals emerges as a scientific and historical conclusion. In other words, the social contract doctrines of Thomas Hobbes and John Lock make sense in this context. Naturally, reason leads to individualism, and individualism leads to the identity of the rational individual, whose limits it knows, and social contracts. The principle of the supremacy of reason, the phenomenon of the rational individual, and the presupposition of a human progression of the historical process outside the will of God, also enabled the formation of Western intellectual movements. The logic of the transformation of the general intellectual atmosphere and the relatively dominant ideological point into the principle of order as a result of the upheavals caused by the French revolution should be sought here. While the principle of order enables the intellectual mood to approach an ideology such as conservatism, it becomes inevitable that what is really important is progress within order. This is precisely the meaning of the motto that if there is to be a change, it must be within the order and the effort of countries like Turkey

that are striving for modernization. Or the transformation of individualism into intellectual movements such as liberalism and radicalism is literally the result of a historical continuity. As a result, the dynamics of modernity, in which human reason replaced the will of God, turned the divine understanding of progress and history into the progress of humanity and led to the formation of new movements of ideas about history and society (Aksakal, 2021: 91).

Enlightenment thought suggested that man could be liberated from tradition and blind faith by using reason to reorganize his relations with nature and other human beings according to rational principles. In short, control over and improvement of the social and natural worlds, fostered by the accumulation of scientific knowledge, were seen as the causes of progressive freedom. However, this optimistic view was countered by a more pessimistic assessment that the very means that promoted the ends of freedom - knowledge and control - could instead produce a modern form of unfreedom. While Marx spoke of the conditions of basic (if not formal) unfreedom that capitalist modernity imposed on the working class, Friedrich Nietzsche directly explored the socio-psychological dimension of this unfreedom. For Nietzsche, ascetic ideals, especially those that sought to regulate action by positing a metaphysical god or transcendent truth, denied life because they made the meaning of existence secure and limited. Nietzsche argues that the "death of God" should be seen as an opportunity to radically affirm social existence in its contingent and variable characteristics, that is, to question the value of truth. Therefore, the Enlightenment is the most important political rupture of modernity (Jameson, 2004: 33). At the same time, modernity is a westernized and western-specific process. In particular, modernity, symbolized as a break with tradition, has provided an important basis for Europe to achieve a strong and superior position. While modernity emphasized the age of reason, it allowed a process in which what is true and beautiful is always defined according to reason, and Kant emerged as an important name at this stage. Because with Kant, reason and the individual were placed at the center of reality.

While rationality is analyzed in connection with modernity, according to Bauman, the most important feature of modernity is that it takes order as a task (Bauman, 2003: 13). At this stage, at the point of order, the metaphor of the gardening state and an activity such as legislating and a tool such as science and philosophy have emerged (Başer, 2013: 116). The gardener state, like the gardener's power over the garden, is the modern state's separation of its subjects as beneficial and harmful around certain principles (Bauman, 2003: 34). Bauman's gardening state also corresponds to Foucault's concept of biopolitics. Because according to Foucault, biopolitics refers to regulation and normalization. It is the control of all phenomena from health to birth and longevity through governmental practices (Foucault, 1993: 101). Both biopolitics and the gardening state propose a functioning based on harmony and normalization, and this functioning leads to the fencing of society by creating uniformization within its borders. While the modern order is dominated by such an understanding of control and surveillance, it also allows for the formation of an activity such as lawmaking. In fact, according to Bauman, these legislators are in charge of eliminating chaos and establishing order by determining right and wrong, good and evil (Bauman, 2003: 37). As a result, it is precisely at this point that Bauman reveals the rationality of modernity and the destruction of the understanding of progress, as I have already mentioned, with his analysis of the Holocaust. Because the product of a rational social engineering aimed at homogeneity of the legislators and the gardener state understanding results in the Jewish genocide (Aksakal, 2019: 502).

The Question of Modernization

Eisenstadt defines modernity as the change that emerged as a result of the economic, political and social developments that took place in Western Europe and North America from the 17th to the 19th centuries, and continues the definition as the spread of this change to other European countries, South America, Asia and Africa (Eisenstadt, 2014: 11). The second part actually shows that

modernity is different from modernization and that modernization has reached a different meaning than the process that took place in the West, especially in Western Europe and North America. While modernity, derived from the Latin word *modernus*, is expressed as a rupture at this stage, modernization gains meaning as the manifestation of the transition from traditional and primitive societies to modern societies. Therefore, modernity has a different structure and expression than modernization. Because modernity is a process witnessed by the West, while modernization should be perceived more as a project. In a sense, modernity is a result rather than a goal. However, modernization should be considered more as a goal and a plan. The concept of modernity, which is specific to the West, is allocated to the historical situation of Western societies (Özgiraz, 2011: 20). Therefore, modernity is the name of the traditional, political, economic and cultural process that started in the West and spread all over the world. However, modernization is the state of becoming aware that modernity and oneself cannot be modern. Modernization is a reaction to the modern. It is a process that develops in relation to the inability to remain indifferent to modernity once it has emerged. In this respect, modernization is a process of imitation. And it is a panic of delay. Every modernization is actually a kind of panic attack. They did it in five centuries and we have to do it in fifty years. And also every modernization is a process of cultural indigestion. Modernization actually corresponds to a way of relating to modernity. However, modernization is also equivalent to equating modernity with the West. Modernization is a reaction to the modern. And this reaction manifests itself first of all by acknowledging that it is not modern and that there is a modern outside itself. Every modernization is actually taking the modern as a model. Modernity is the model of modernization. Societies that cannot produce modernity can only try to modernize. In this sense, modernization is coming from behind in the temporal sense. For societies like ours that find modernity in the West, modernization is Westernization. Modernization is actually a discourse of defeat. For example, the West did not transform according to an existing model.

The West has become modern. We are modernizing. Modernization is voluntary. It requires a decision in this direction. The West becoming modern is a process, not a will. Modernity is a process. Modernization is more of a project. Therefore, the West became modern with its own internal social class dynamics. In this sense, modernity is a result, not a goal. The construction of modernity in the West is a social process. Modernity comes into being as a result of the clash of personal class and group interests of social agents. The nation state, urbanization, the nuclear family, industrial production, the republic and democracy. What we call modern is pensions, human rights, children's and animal rights. Modernization, on the other hand, is the reaction to this process by societies that have not produced modernity themselves but live on the edge of it. In this sense, modernization starts with the realization that it is not modern. It started from the same point in our society.

Sociological Analysis of Turkish Modernization

In societies like Turkey, which could not produce modernity, could not become modern with its own internal dynamics, but where this phenomenon is understood as a project, it is the intellectuals who construct modernity. While the West constructed modernity in continuity with its past and present through the bourgeoisie, its counterpart in Turkish society was the intellectuals who wanted to create a space of ability to change and continue. Turkish modernization is the ironic consciousness of having to call what for centuries was considered a land of kufr a land of greatness. Turkish modernization should be perceived as an important project when considered as a non-western effort. Because modernity is a process and modernization is a project. While the West welcomed modernity as an outcome by returning to its historical roots and building its present and future, modernizing countries like Turkey were included in this process as a result of a will. Because modernization is a reaction to the modern. To examine Turkish modernization around the goal of reaching mamuriyet, the necessity of defining meşvereti and the effort to reach contemporary civilization. The attempt to

define Ottoman-Turkish modernization around a political goal of modernization corresponds to a process that chose to modernize through intellectuals. Turkish modernization, which is evaluated in the context of non-Western or alternative modernization, has been surrounded by feelings and actions of denial, rejection, inadequacy and trying to emulate. Turkish modernization has had to break away from its own roots and present a foreign world that it did not build as its own essence. Especially in a period of great ruptures, social and political transformations in the West, the Ottoman Empire was struggling both to resist this process and to re-establish the broken order. Turkish modernization is dominated by a Comtean organismist view of society, centering on the conception of a harmonious society centered on solidarity. This means that, especially with the Republic, the construction of the modern nation as a form of social integration had to produce a structure that would resist the Marxist ideological pressure. In other words, the curriculum of all perceptions and steps related to modernization constitutes the mass of intellectuals who feel the obligation to create a holistic, harmonious society.

It is understood that the construction of nationhood or later nation-building, which spread as a cyclical wave in the name of modernization, which Sadık Rıfat Pasha called *mamuriyet*, Namık Kemal called *meşveret* and Mustafa Kemal called contemporary civilization, was shaped by intellectual life. Preventing the disintegration of the Empire, ensuring the continuity of the pre-modern nation system, and with the Republic, the construction of a modern nation state became the sole objectives. Unlike the left, which prioritizes economy and class, the Turkish right's field of reciprocity is to address issues of religion, culture and history within the framework of harmony and integration. Social cohesion, integration and sensitivity towards the preservation of the traditional order are related to the creation of a modern sense of us. Turkish modernization is the name of the renewal movements initiated by the state in the Ottoman Empire from the eighteenth century onwards. Because, unlike in the West, efforts that lack social and cultural

support and foundation are formed with the intention of strengthening the administration and management of the state. Ideologies such as conservatism, liberalism, socialism and nationalism, which emerged as a result of great transformations in the West, emerged with different identities in the Ottoman and Republican periods because they lacked the necessary social ground. In general terms, these are manifested as nationalism, solidarism, populism and Turkism. Because modernization is the process of transferring the values and philosophy created by western civilization, and transforming the culture and worldview of non-western societies in the process of this transfer. In a sense, it is the coloring of the local.

In particular, transformation is one of the key concepts of the Ottoman modernization effort. It is the transformation of the Ottoman Empire, which lagged behind the West militarily, in order to save the state as a counterpart to the understanding of the sacred state. The most important feature that distinguishes Ottoman modernization from Republican modernization at this stage is that the goal of modernization was limited to the modernization of the state. It is a state-centered understanding of modernity that developed and continued as a partial reform policy. In this context, with an understanding that prioritized the survival of the state, bureaucrats made an effort to overcome the increasing military defeats and deepening crisis against the West and tried to establish new channels of contact with Europe in a way that was unprecedented in the past. During the period of great ruptures in the West, the Ottoman Empire endeavored both to resist this process and to re-establish its disrupted order. Although the concepts of progress, rationalism and individualism, which the West transferred to the modern and capitalist age with its enlightenment, found a counterpart in Ottoman intellectual life, this lacked the social ground, economic and social basis as in the West. What was important for the Ottomans was the functioning of the political and administrative mechanism. The strengthening of the administration and the state is related to the re-establishment and reconstruction of

the sacred state and the institution of holiness that defends the world of order. In this context, the most important step in solving problematic areas is the strengthening of the central administration. The method is to restore the state order to its former strength and to find a solution to the military superiority of the West. The most serious reforms in this direction took place during the reigns of Selim III and Mahmut II. However, even though these efforts are considered as a beginning of modernization, they are rather superficial in terms of complex and multifaceted problems. The first painful period of Turkish modernization coincides with the Tanzimat. Because Tanzimat made the gap between the center and the periphery more pronounced, social and political dualism became more visible.

Ottoman modernization, which began with the Tanzimat and continued with the First and Second Constitutional Monarchies, continued its regulatory and supervisory attitude with the Young Turk Ottoman intellectuals, who wanted to enlighten and transform the masses with western science and science, until the republican elite intellectuals. The pioneers of Ottoman modernization turned to models that had taken concrete form since the double revolutions in Western Europe (the industrial and French revolutions). The Young Turks, who initially formed a new coterie of political elites with liberal tendencies, changed course in the third year of their rule (1908-1918) (Karaca, 2020: 118). Because it is possible to find the origins of social currents such as many institutions in the Republic in the Ottoman modernization process (Karaca, 2015: 87). As a project of modernity, Tanzimat also sought to strengthen the state mechanism against internal and external threats and to enact equalizing reforms for non-Muslims. However, this initiative, which was rather superficial and far from a systematic transformation program, did not prevent the emergence of certain objections and disturbances. In particular, the move to strip Muslims of their privileged status as millet-i hakimiye aimed to create an identity of Ottoman citizenship regardless of religion. The modernization of the empire, which was limited to the modernization of the state. The

modernization of the empire, which was limited to the modernization of the state, included many principles such as a national identity, citizen loyalty, secular space, and the journey from the discourses of mashveret and mamuriyet to contemporary civilization. It is precisely at this stage that the modernization of the Republic turns into a total change move. In fact, these modernization efforts intend to position the citizen instead of the servant, the nation instead of the subject, the homeland instead of the universe of nizam-ı âlemin, and a general understanding and belonging based on a national identity. The cultural program of modernity tries to equate civilized people with Westernized people (Karaca, 2015: 350). When the French Revolution and the Enlightenment philosophy developed an understanding that shifted the source of sovereignty from God to the nation, loyalty to the nation constituted an important point of resistance and tension. At this stage, Republican modernization, influenced by positivist progressivism, aimed to reach the positivist stage in Comte's historical scheme as soon as possible. Positivism is the epistemic source of the republican modernization as it gives political content to the idea of order and makes nationalization inevitable through scientific truths instead of the authority established by religious knowledge for centuries. The historical process and the possibility of analysis, which present modernization as two types, enable us to develop the ability to interpret the French and Anglo-Saxon conceptions of modernity. As a result, the representatives of French-secular modernization are names and schools such as Mustafa Reşit Pasha, Committee of Union and Progress, Atatürk, while conservative modernization has advocates such as Ahrar Party, Prince Sabahattin, Progressive Party, Democrat and Justice Party.

Conclusion

It is possible to say that post-modern societies and times have replaced the discussions on modernity in our time. In fact, in the second half of the 20th century, there is no shortage of discussions that state that modernity is almost over. In fact, discussions on

multiple modernities or modernities outside the West are frequently held, and there are statements claiming that modernity will be possible outside the West. Therefore, the assumption that modernity is not the monopoly and subjectivity of the West emerges as an important point of view and area of debate. However, especially when we consider the Tanzimat-Mashrutiyyet and Republican modernization processes, the goal of modernization efforts, the mentality in which modernization is accepted as a project and the process in which change is understood as a need of the state, western modernity and modernization with a different content should be understood. In this context, Modernus has a Latin etymology and corresponds to the concept of the contemporary. It is the antonym of the word ancient, or more accurately, the opposite of ancient. And it is the product of social, economic and political change in Western Europe and North America starting from the 17th century until the 19th century. While it corresponds to a process allocated to the West, the scientific, cultural and economic revolution determines the process of becoming modern. Modernity is a process of rebellion and change. It is also the creation of a new model of social organization on a plane where old social connections are eroded. It is also a reaction against the old regime, thought and belief structure. The transition from one state to another includes many aspects such as secularism, the prioritization of reason and science, and anthropocentrism. It also corresponds to deep upheavals and manifests itself as social, cultural and economic transformation. Modernity corresponds to a process that moves from the theological stage to the positivist stage, from military society to industrial society, from mechanical solidarity to organic solidarity. Modernity is recognized as a western process. In other words, the construction of modernity in the West is a social process. It is the result of the conflict of personal, class and group interests. It comes into being as nation state, urbanization, nuclear family, industry, republic and democracy. Modernization, on the other hand, has a different content from modernity. Because modernization is a reaction. It is a process that develops by not being indifferent to modernity after it emerges.

Because modernization corresponds to a way of establishing a relationship with modernity, and modernization is the acceptance of modernity as equivalent to the West. This acceptance starts with the belief that modernizing societies are not modern themselves and that there is a modern outside of themselves. Because every modernization is to take the modern as a model. There is no other society, or more accurately, no other society that the West takes as a model in the process of modernity. It has been subject to its own process of social change based on its own experience. Modernity therefore corresponds to a process. Modernization is more of a goal and a project. While the West reached modernity through its own historical, social and class dynamics, modernity appears as a result. For example, in the West, commercial capitalism developed within the feudal structure, cities were formed, and the feudal power structure began to dissolve.

Capital, which gradually accumulated in the cities, began to demand power, and the process of a new class coming to power began to mature from a Marxist perspective (Dellaloğlu, 2021: 160). Therefore, the reaction of the non-modern to modernity is modernization. In this respect, modernization is initially a process of imitation. It is actually a panic of being late. In other words, modernization is a kind of panic attack. It is the feeling of coming from behind, of being left behind. Therefore, it is an effort to reach modernity in a short period of time, which emerges at the end of a process, and a process of cultural indigestion in parallel. The main actor of modernity in the West is society, but in modernization countries it is the state. Modernization is the reaction of societies that did not produce modernity themselves to this process. Modernization is the westernization of societies that find modernity in their own west. While in modernity, power moves from the social to the political, in modernization countries there is a movement from the political to the social. In the West, of course, there is a mass of intellectuals who have influenced the processes of social change, and all this has been socialized in some way. Of course, defining modernity as a process and modernization as a project also allows

for some reductionist definitions. Or, of course, the project dimension of being modern in the West should also be mentioned, but we should state that it corresponds more to a process there and more to a project in modernization countries. And it should even be stated that the classes made the revolution in the West, but in addition to this, the ideas of intellectuals prepared the ground of mentality. Therefore, modernity moves more from the social to the political. However, modernization is a political project and is based on the demands of the state. For this reason, every modernization is a bit superstructural, hierarchical and intellectual movement. It is also possible to explain the difference between modernity and modernization through sociological and anthropological readings. According to Delaloğlu, when Mübeccel Kıray was asked about the difference between sociology and anthropology, she replied that if you do it in the village, it is anthropology, and if you do it in the city, it is sociology. In other words, sociology is the anthropology of the city, anthropology is the sociology of the countryside. Sociology is the social science discipline envisaged by the West when studying its own societies. Anthropology is the study of other societies. Or sociology is the anthropology of the west and anthropology is the sociology of the east. In short, sociology is the analysis of post-traditional societies, anthropology is the analysis of traditional, pre-modern societies. In particular, such a perspective offers the possibility of reading through the distinction between society and community and analyzing the difference between modernity and modernization. If it is assumed that there is no society outside the West, another perspective is needed when researching there, and that is anthropology.

For this reason, the Turkish modernization effort has brought along an ironic consciousness. Especially considering the fact that the term "Turkish modernization" became quite widespread with Şerif Mardin, it is seen that different expressions were used instead of the concept before. Usages such as mamuriyet, muasır civilization, meşveret are related to this ironic consciousness. Especially since the Ottoman Empire, it was on the battlefields that

modernity was recognized and modernization was felt as a necessity. Therefore, modernization first emerges as a militaristic need. Considering the general economic and administrative structure of the Ottoman Empire, it is necessary to accept that conquest was the field of production and this field was the main basis of reproduction. Therefore, the modernization in question is a militaristic modernization. Because the motivation for modernization was born on the battlefields. It is also top-down, that is, hierarchical and therefore militaristic. Ottoman Turkish modernization is an elitist modernization. Of course, all modernization styles are like this, it came to the agenda as a political project, its social base is not very strong. It is a modernization that the state needs. And Turkish modernization was not a sociological process. Ottoman-Turkish modernization is accepted as a political modernization, as a voluntary action through intellectuals. Or it is the fact that it broke away from its own roots and encountered a world it did not build and perhaps had to present it as its own essence. Turkish modernization is *mamuriyet* in Sadık Rıfat Pasha, *meşveret* in Namık Kemal and contemporary civilization in Mustafa Kemal. These usages are not unconscious. Turkish modernization is the goal of bringing the country to prosperity. *Mamuriyet* is the content of achieving total success by the state taking full responsibility in areas where the people are deemed inadequate. According to Sadık Rıfat Pasha, *mamuriyet* is the development of the country, the increase in population and the readiness of the army as much as possible. At the same time, Turkish modernization can be explained in terms of the method of *meşveret* as the goal of political and intellectual action. It is the epistemic and methodological framework of a certain progress and modernization, with the necessity of the parliamentary regime, the necessity of freedom and the need for democracy. In general terms, modernization theories have also expressed the process of the West becoming modern as a project for non-Western societies. However, what is mentioned here is the reaction of societies that cannot remain indifferent to modernity in relation to the West. In general, Tanzimat, Constitutional Monarchy and

Republican modernizations are evaluated in this respect. However, what really needs to be discussed now is whether social modernity is possible in Turkey. Whether there is a society behind the demand for modernity. Whether such a consciousness has been formed or not. If the society forms such a demand, is it as the modernizing cadres envisaged or is there a demand independent of them? Perhaps this dimension of the debate is now important.

One of the approaches that deals with Turkish society and moreover sociology through the distinction between modernity, modernization, east and west is the East-West conflict approach. This approach does not consider the East-West divide as a new phenomenon, but takes it as far back as human history. According to this approach, the historical process of Eastern societies and the historical process of Western societies are different from each other. Eastern societies are different from Western societies in terms of both their historical and present social structures. Eastern societies are "state-centered societies" where class structures have not developed. Western societies, on the other hand, are "class societies". Eastern societies are based on the state, while Western societies are based on class. For example, Kaçmazoğlu stated that sociology, the science of Western crises, was transferred to Turkey as soon as it was born in the West. According to him, the aim of the sociology transferred from the West was to find solutions to our problems with its sanctified terms and methods, and especially to introduce Westernization to the masses.

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CHAPTER II

Coding and Decoding Social Biases in Artificial Intelligence: Exploring Bias Awareness among AI Developers

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Introduction

Recent technological progresses have made significant breakthroughs, with artificial intelligence (AI) at the forefront, empowering computer systems to perform tasks that traditionally required human intelligence, such as visual perception, speech recognition, decision-making, and natural language processing. AI employs techniques like machine learning, deep learning, and neural networks to analyze vast datasets, recognize patterns, and make predictions or decisions. Its application spans across multiple

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industries, including healthcare, finance, transportation, and manufacturing with the potential to automate processes, enhance efficiency, and uncover insights beyond human capacity. Facial recognition systems enhance security and crime prevention, and other AI solutions aid early disease diagnosis, treatment optimization, and improved patient care in healthcare. In the realm of recruitment, AI algorithms streamline processes, offering efficiency and time savings. However, their potential for objective evaluation and prejudice reduction in candidate selection is subject to debate. Therefore, when addressing AI's ethical and societal implications, it is crucial to address its role in perpetuating social issues like gender, race and ethnicity based biases, which is the primary focus of this study.

Social implications of technological progress raise concerns about how they influence the existing social order and its social problems caused by social inequities, prejudice, and discrimination. To establish a fair and sustainable system, addressing such challenges is essential. Thus, it is crucial that not only social scientists but also AI developers should be aware of how advances in technology can perpetuate existing inequalities. This research explores AI developers' awareness about the reproduction of gender, race and ethnicity based biases through AI and their proposed solutions.

This study targets AI practitioners, including academics, scientists, developers, and financiers and conducts surveys to reveal their perspectives on gender and race related biases in AI systems. The surveys aim to examine how they understand the concepts of gender, race and ethnicity, how social biases and inequalities are produced around these concepts, and how AI systems may reproduce these biases and inequalities. By studying AI developers' awareness of the concepts of gender, race and ethnicity, the aim is to contribute to discussions on how the social implications of technological advances can be improved with equity and sustainability values.

The following first briefly defines the sociological understanding of the concepts of gender, race and ethnicity, and it reviews the existing research on how AI applications such as facial recognition and hiring algorithms reproduce prejudice and discrimination around these identities. Then it presents the methodology of the study. After the presentation and discussion of the findings the study is concluded.

AI and Reproduction of Gender, Race and Ethnicity Based Biases

Gender refers to the social and cultural expectations and norms that are associated with male and female identities and are defined as masculinity or femininity. Gender is not a fixed or innate characteristic, but rather a fluid and socially constructed identity and gender roles vary across cultures and time periods. However, traditionally, in patriarchal societies being masculine is associated with characteristics such as being strong, rational, active, and dominant, while femininity is traditionally associated with being fragile, emotional, passive, and submissive. These characteristics are further linked to certain social roles such that being a CEO is traditionally perceived as a man's role while domestic work is traditionally perceived as a woman's role (Schaefer, 2013). Thus, while being a social construct, gender has significant effects on individuals' social experiences, opportunities, and outcomes (Lorber, 1994; Schaefer, 2013).

Race is another socially constructed concept which refers to a set of physical and biological characteristics such as skin color, hair texture, and facial features which are used to categorize individuals into different racial groups. Like gender, race is also not a biologically meaningful category but a social construct which racializes groups of people and creates hierarchies between them by referring to them as advanced or inferior. In this way race also effects people's overall life experiences (Omi and Winant, 2014; Schaefer, 2013).

Ethnicity as a concept is used to refer to groups of people differentiated on the basis of their national origin, or shared cultural features such as language, customs and institutions. Ethnic groups are considered as cultural groups who claim ethnic distinctiveness, or which has distinctiveness imposed on them (Abercrombie et al., 2006: 136). Although ethnic differences in a society point at its cultural diversity, claims on the clear differences and separation between ethnic groups may evoke the idea of separation of people in the sense of us/them, similar to racist ideologies.

As sexism and racism continues to exist in societies, women and racialized groups are often the targets of prejudice, which are negative opinions that target all members of a group of people. Prejudice often leads to discrimination, which is the deprivation of opportunities or equal rights to individuals or groups because of prejudice (Schaefer, 2013). Therefore, both concepts are interconnected and have significant implications for how individuals are treated and valued in society. It is discussed that in the context of AI, biases related to gender, race and ethnicity can be reproduced and amplified if the algorithms are not designed to account for these factors (Noble, 2018).

AI refers to the ability of machines to perform tasks that typically require human intelligence to complete. AI algorithms and systems use a variety of techniques, including machine learning, natural language processing, computer vision, and robotics to analyze data, recognize patterns, make predictions, and perform actions. An example of AI in action is autonomous vehicles. Driverless cars use a combination of sensors, cameras, and artificial intelligence algorithms to navigate roads, avoid obstacles and make decisions based on their surroundings. These cars can adapt to changing road conditions and make decisions based on real-time data without human intervention. In general, AI has the potential to revolutionize many industries, from manufacturing and logistics to healthcare, education, finance, and security (Russell and Norvig, 2020).

One of the fundamental operating principles of AI, the algorithm that can be defined as its decision-making component, provides guidance on what actions an AI should take and how it should react. In other words, the data in the algorithms has purposes (Beer, 2017: 3). By stating that these algorithmic codes are written by humans thus powered by social life, it is discussed that AI is embedded with values and the engineers who code the algorithms are the bearers of value (Joyce et al., 2021). Therefore, AI is not an objective technology, furthermore it is argued that AI is political enough to take an active role in the reproduction of social inequalities (Bartoletti, 2020; Beer, 2017; Joyce et al., 2021).

Algorithmic bias occurs when an AI system produces sided, incorrect and/or unjust outcomes due to biased training data, flawed algorithms, or incorrect assumptions made during development. In the case of sexist or racist outcomes, this can occur if the training data contains biased or incomplete information about women, people of color, or people from marginalized communities. When examining the harmful effects of bias in AI, there are many examples about facial recognition, predictive policing, and loan approval algorithms. Facial recognition algorithms have been found to be biased toward certain racial and ethnic groups, for example the accuracy of biometric technology is found to be lowest in dark-skinned women and highest in fair-skinned women (Buolamwini and Gebru, 2018). Racial bias has also been detected in algorithms used to make healthcare decisions (Obermeyer et al., 2019). Predictive policing algorithms have been criticized for being biased against communities of color. This is because these algorithms use historical crime data to predict where crime is likely to occur in the future, but if the data is biased against certain groups, then the algorithm will make biased predictions (Angwin et al, 2016). Similarly, loan approval algorithms have been found to be biased against racialized and ethnic groups. One study found that an algorithm used by a large bank to make credit decisions was biased against African American borrowers (Hanson et al, 2016). Amazon reportedly abandoned its AI recruiting tools in 2018 after it was found to be biased against

women. Since the system was trained on resumes submitted to Amazon over a 10-year period mostly by men, the system learned to prioritize male candidates over female candidates (Lee et al., 2019). Another example is a chatbot called Tay, created by Microsoft, which was released on Twitter in 2016 and quickly became racist and sexist as a result of its interactions with users (Zemčík, 2021).

In addition to these examples, discrimination based on race and gender is observed in many online platforms such as search engines and recommendation systems (Datta et al., 2015; Lambrecht and Tucker, 2018; Noble, 2018). Noble (2018) named the construction of profiles on individuals with racial data as “technological redlining” or “digital redlining”. Here, Noble uncovered a group of studies that reproduced historical injustices against people of color (Gilliard and Culik 2016).

Overall, a conclusion drawn from these studies is that it is important to be aware of algorithmic bias in AI systems and take steps to reduce and erase them to prevent discrimination against individuals and groups. Obviously, the initial step in preventing the use of biased data is the acceptance of biased data, only then the necessary actions can be taken. To avoid gender-based discrimination in AI products, D'Ignazio and Klein (2020) suggest evaluating the ideology underlying algorithms' datasets, such as examining how gender is represented in the data and make necessary improvements accordingly. Undoubtedly, this recommendation can be followed for the prevention of race-based discriminations too. If such an approach is incorporated into the data collection phase of AI learning, potentially problematic patterns that could generate any gender and race-based discrimination will be deciphered. Another solution comes from Hawkins (2018), who proposes that data bias caused by the underrepresentation of marginalized groups can be eliminated by collecting or incorporating more data from those groups of people. Another solution, obviously, is for AI developers to become aware of how gender and race-based bias and notions of differences are reproduced with AI and take necessary measures against such conditions.

Methodology

In this study, a questionnaire design was used to collect data from people involved in the AI development process, such as academics, software developers, funders, and project designers. Participants were reached through universities, institutes, companies developing artificial intelligence, non-governmental organizations, and LinkedIn. The sample included 60 participants from different age, gender, and occupation groups. Data were collected between 2 May 2023 and 19 May 2023. The questionnaire consisted of 26 questions including both open-ended and closed-ended questions.

Ethical considerations were taken into account during the study process. Participants provided informed consent before the survey and their confidentiality was protected throughout and after the study.

Content analysis method was used to analyze the responses collected from surveys. With content analysis, the data were classified into certain categories, the emerging themes and their occurrence frequencies were identified.

This study also has some limitations. First, there were difficulties in reaching suitable participants. There was reluctance to participate in the study or to provide feedback among potential participants. This may limit the representativeness of the sample and make it difficult to generalize the results. Secondly, during the participant research, it was observed that the number of female employees in the artificial intelligence sector is low. This limits gender-based analyzes of the study and does not fully reflect the perspectives of female workers. The next section presents the findings of the study collected through surveys measuring AI developers' awareness about the issues in question.

Findings

60 people working in different areas of AI technologies participated in the surveys. Only four (6.67%) of the participants

were female, the majority were male (f: 56; 93.33%), which indicates the male dominance in technology areas. Majority of the participants were between 25-34 years old (40%), followed by the age groups of 35-44 years old (26.67%), 18-24 years old (18.33%), 45-54 years old (11.67%), and 55 years and over (3.33%). The professions of the female participants were noted as AI ecosystem manager, AI project designer, data scientist, and engineer. Majority of the participants (45%) were marked as engineers; followed by AI developers (35%), software developers (31.67%), AI project designers (21.67%), data scientists (20%), academics (11.67%), managers (3.33%), financiers (3.33%), AI ecosystem managers (1.67%), process and project managers (1.67%), and data quality experts (1.67%). The profile the participants are presented in Table 1.

Table 1 - Profile of the Participants

	f	%
Gender		
Male	56	93,33
Female	4	6,67
Profession		
Engineer	27	45
AI Developer	21	35
Software Developer	19	31,67
AI Project Designer	13	21,67
Data Scientist	12	20
Academician	7	11,67
Manager	2	3,33
Financier	2	3,33
AI Ecosystem Manager	1	1,67
Process and Project Manager	1	1,67
Data Quality Specialist	1	1,67
Age		
25-34	24	40
35-44	16	26,67
18-24	11	18,33
45-54	7	11,67
55 and above	2	3,33

AI Developers' Knowledge and Awareness on Gender, Race and Ethnicity

The majority of the participants (f: 53; 88.33%) stated that they had knowledge about biases based on gender and racialized/ethnic identities, while 11.67% (f: 7) of them stated they did not. However, the other responses revealed that there is some variability in their knowledge and understanding of these concepts and issues.

When they were asked about the definition of gender discrimination, the majority selected the answer "a situation where a person is disadvantaged because of their gender". Other most selected options were "a situation where privileged treatment of any gender is acceptable", "an approach that considers men to be superior and competent than women", and "women not having equal rights with men" (Table 2). Actually, discrimination based on gender includes any situation where women or men are not provided equal opportunities and rights in an equitable manner. Thus, participants' responses indicate that they have an awareness of gender-based biases since the majority perceives gender discrimination as a disadvantaged situation experienced due to gender identity, while 44.64% of male participants chose different expressions to describe gender discrimination.

Table 2 - Definition of Gender Discrimination

Definition of gender discrimination	Fem ale	M ale	f	%
A situation where a person is disadvantaged due to their gender	4	31	35	58,33
A situation where any privileged behavior towards a particular gender is considered acceptable	0	15	5	25
An approach that considers men to be superior and more competent than women	0	6	6	10
Women not having equal rights as men	0	4	4	6,67

Participants were asked similar questions about the definitions of race and ethnicity. It was observed that their understanding of the concepts showed differences (Table 3). Most of the participants (f: 31; 51,67%) answered that "race refers to biological differences between people, while ethnicity refers to cultural differences". 35 percent (f: 21) answered "both are concepts constructed to describe people's biological and cultural differences". Less selected answers were "the concepts of race and ethnicity are exactly the same thing" (f: 4; 6.67%) and "the concepts of race and ethnicity are completely different and not related to each other" (f: 2; 3.33%).

Table 3 - Definitions of Race and Ethnicity

Definition of race and ethnicity discrimination	Fem ale	M ale	f	%
Race refers to biological differences between people, while ethnicity refers to cultural differences	4	27	31	51,67
Both concepts are constructed to describe the biological and cultural differences of individuals	0	21	21	35
Race and ethnicity are completely the same concepts	0	4	4	6,67
Race refers to skin color, while ethnicity refers to the place where a person was born	0	2	2	3,33
Race and ethnicity are completely different concepts and are not related to each other	0	2	2	3,33
Both concepts describe the biological and character traits of individuals	0	0	0	0

The most selected first two options show that participants have knowledge that the concepts of race and ethnicity are used to differentiate people biologically and culturally, but the second option acknowledges that these are socially constructed concepts, products of social structures that categorize people as different from each other. It is important that 35 percent of the AI developers

recognize these concepts being social constructs, which is important to realize that as AI applications use already produced knowledge, they will be reproducing the existing racial and ethnic bias, thus further AI solutions should be developed to prevent the reproduction of biases.

When the participants' perception on the concept of prejudice was examined, it was found that they had problematic views. Prejudice is defined as the tendency to make negative, often incorrect, or unfair judgments about a person or group because of presuppositions or pre-existing beliefs (Schaefer, 2013). Accordingly, most of the participants (f: 32; 53.33%) responded that prejudice refers to "negative judgments and thoughts targeting any person or group". However, the rest had an incorrect understanding. 25% (f: 15) of the participants answered that prejudice is about "not giving special treatment to any special group or person" and 21.67% (f:13) answered prejudice is "an objective evaluation based on the actions of a person or group". These findings show that in total 47% percent of the participants do not have a correct understanding of what prejudice is.

Incorrect or insufficient information about what prejudice is should not be seen merely as a simple case of unawareness, but reflection of a societal problem. This finding highlights the need for information and awareness raising activities which are important steps toward building fair perspectives and reducing prejudices.

Another important concept that is reinforced by prejudice is discrimination. Discrimination is generally accepted as the denial of equal rights and opportunities of a certain group because of prejudices (Schaefer, 2013). Responses to the question about what discrimination is showed that the majority (f: 49; 81.67%) perceived discrimination correctly as "the inability of a group to benefit from equal rights and opportunities due to prejudice". 15% (f: 9) confused discrimination with prejudice and answered, "negative judgments and thoughts targeting any person or group". Only 3.33% (f: 2) of the participants answered, surprisingly, "an objective evaluation

based on the actions of a person or group". It is seen that AI developers in general have a fair understanding of discrimination, but a small group of them need training about its difference from prejudice.

Participants were also asked from which sources they were informed about the concepts of gender, race, ethnicity, prejudice, and discrimination are (Table 4). Here, participants could select more than one option. The two most important resources were indicated as the media, including newspapers, television, and social media (f: 27) and social circles (f: 26). Then, the readings completed out of personal interests in the fields of feminist theory, critical race theories and sociology (f: 17) and the university courses such as sociology, anthropology, and women's studies (f: 13) were the other important resources. Also, a significant ratio (f: 23) indicated that there were no particular resources in the development of their opinions on gender, race, ethnicity, prejudice and discrimination.

Table 4 - Ranking of Sources of Information

Where did you learn about these concepts (gender, race, ethnicity, prejudice, discrimination)?		f
1	Conversations in social circle	26
2	No particular reading. My own opinions	23
3	Readings in the fields of feminist theory, racial theories, and sociology out of own interest	17
4	The media (newspaper, television)	17
5	Courses such as sociology, anthropology, and women's studies taken at university	13
6	Social media	10

Considering the participants who received academic training and those who read in the fields of feminist theory, critical race theories and sociology, 70% of them had a correct understanding of the concept of sexism and 21.05% had a correct understanding of race and ethnicity. Unsurprisingly, these findings show that

academic education and intellectual interests produce significant consequences for people's understanding on social matters, although they may not be ranked at the top of the list. The media have also greatly contributed to the awareness on these issues by bringing them to the agenda through news and discussions. Interactions with people in social environments also function as an important source for acquiring knowledge. Overall, the findings show that traditional agents of socialization (social environment, media, education) stand out as the main resources that enrich and diversify people's knowledge about gender, race, ethnicity, prejudice, and discrimination.

Finally, participants were asked about prejudice in AI systems, and they had mixed opinions. While the majority (f: 36, 60%) believed that prejudice targeting certain identities exist in AI algorithms, a significant proportion (f: 17, 28,33%) disagreed. This disagreement underscores the importance of developing and auditing AI algorithms in accordance with principles of impartiality and fairness. The participants identified non-white individuals, Eastern ethnicities and women as identities that face prejudice in AI algorithms. They link these prejudices as caused by dataset selection, wrong data usage, and biased training processes. To ensure unbiased results, it is crucial to accurately select datasets, manage training processes, and foster diversity in AI research.

Discussion and Conclusion

AI technologies, which are rapidly developing and becoming widespread, cause concern as well as they arouse curiosity. One of the major concerns is the prevalence of biased AI solutions. While considering the effects of gender and race-based biases in AI products and applications that are available on the market, the awareness among those people contributing to the development of these technologies has been a matter of curiosity. This curiosity was the starting point of this study.

The study provides valuable insights into AI developers awareness about gender, race, ethnicity, prejudice, and discrimination, as well as their perceptions of biases and discrimination in AI. The findings indicate that while the majority claim to have knowledge about social biases based on gender and race/ethnic identity, there is variability in their understanding and awareness of these issues. In general, the participating AI developers have relatively better knowledge on the concepts of gender, race, and ethnicity, whereas they have an incorrect understanding of prejudice. It was also observed that those who held better understanding of these concepts were the ones who took university courses and completed readings on these subjects, indicating that formal education and interest-oriented readings are still the most effective sources of information in the 21st century. The AI developers also acknowledged that AI was biased against certain identities, particularly against the non-white and Eastern groups of people and women. It is significant that those who are involved in the development of this technology are aware of the prejudices that are maintained and reproduced through the same technology.

In an interview, data journalist Meredith Broussard states that systemic problems such as racism and sexism, which are deeply ingrained in societies, manifest themselves in technological systems (Corbyn, 2023). AI is no different than these technological systems. Just as it is initially important to accept the existence of social problems in order to fight against them, the same thing applies to technological developments. What is needed to reduce biased and prejudiced information produced by AI is to accept that the information available to AI is biased. In order to solve the problem, it is important for AI developers to comprehend why information is biased. Therefore, it is vitally important for technology developers to have a good understanding of the concepts of gender, race, ethnicity, prejudice, and discrimination, and how they create inequalities between groups of people in society.

This study has some limitations which need to be mentioned. The demographic characteristics of the sample reveal a gender

imbalance, with a small percentage of female respondents compared to male respondents. Although this is a limitation for the study, it is also a reflection of a social matter which is about the underrepresentation of women in the fields of science and technology. Thus, the low level of female participation in the study highlights the need for greater diversity and inclusion in the field of AI development to ensure a more balanced representation and perspective.

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CHAPTER III

“Do You Remember, Once We Would Take National Security Lecture?”: On Understanding Imam Hatip School Female Student’s Experiences

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Introduction

There is an interesting aspect of Turkish education up until the year of 2012. In Turkey a course named National Security was taught in the second grade of high schools which a military official would come to the school in order to teach the course. The curriculum included topics such as the definition of National Security, national security strategies, the history of Turkish Armed Forces, Atatürk and his principles and Turkey’s relation with its neighboring countries as well as external threats to Turkish Republic due to its geopolitical location. When we get to 2012, the lecture was abolished from the curriculum of high schools during the prime ministry of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to repel the discussion of

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European Union about Turkey when they denounced the country with the militarization of education. However, when we look back into history, we see that this course has relatively old history beginning with the foundation of the Republic. Republic of Turkey, having been founded after the First World War and a society which got out of a war, military and militaristic education was seen natural to civil population. Therefore, military in the minds of the masses enjoyed a degree of hierarchy. If we were to point out a certain date for this course, then we can easily say that the implementation of National Security course first appeared in 1926. (Altınay, 2004, p. 8) “From the early 1930s this concept of a military nation was vigorously inculcated through the education system.” (Jenkins, 2007, p. 340) Hence, education was an important apparatus to build the connection and imagination of military-society in the citizens. Interestingly for over eighty years the course was taught in the schools, but it did not take that much of attention from the scholarly circles beyond the theoretical frameworks. Therefore, this paper’s aim is to bring national security course to surface but with a twist: national security courses in Imam Hatip schools.

In Turkey, Imam Hatip Schools have always been a subject of discussion for both leftist and conservative segments of society. The discussions regarding to Imam Hatip Schools is not new to the current politics of Turkey but rather, the discussions took on different forms from the time that Imam Hatip schools have been founded by the state in Early Republican Period. Historically, when each political party rise in power, the strategies on Imam Hatip Schools changed which made them a tool used by political parties in political arena.

Coming to the scope of analysis of this initial research, my main aim is to understand the perceptions and experiences of women during National Security courses who educated in in Imam Hatip schools in the second half of the 1990s. The initial aim of the study is important on several points. First the time period chosen for the scope of analysis is one of the important and very hot debated time periods in Turkey which the rising conservative parties and ‘political

Islam' was seen as a threat against the modern nation-state which the state was founded with the Kemalist principles. Secondly, as Özyürek nicely put in her work, with the rise of 'political Islam' in Turkey, the society went through important changes such as the propaganda of Mustafa Kemal taken by the civil population as oppose to the rising Islamic discourses. (Özyürek, 2006) In addition, Navaro-Yashin's work also proves us how during 1990s, identities were in two different spectrums within the market: conservatives and leftists/Kemalists. (Navaro-Yashin, 2002) Taken into consideration the above-mentioned ethnographic studies as well as the political historical and social atmosphere of 1990s, doing a fieldwork regarding to the experiences of women students in National Security courses in Imam Hatip schools will reveal so much understanding to religion, nation state and military since the national security courses were taught by a military official who came to the lecture once a week.

The first part of the article "Military, Religion, Imam Hatip Schools: the historical background" focuses on the historical process of military and religion during nation-state formation. Military and religion are both regarded as the faces of nation-state, each enjoying a crucial standpoint for culture, politics and history of the Republican Turkey. Imam Hatip Highschools will be placed in-between the faces of -military and religion- nation-state to understand how Imam Hatip school students might experience a different process than other government schools? The second part of the article gives accounts from interlocutors' understanding of Imam Hatip Schools, and what does it mean for them to be an imam Hatip student? Since the time period is escalating in terms of left/Kemalist and right/conservative. studying in Imam Hatip Schools becomes a part of identity. The third part analyses the classroom as a contested proximity, a space where discussions and thoughts are contesting with each other. The last part, "Emotion" analyses how emotion has a collective nature in itself, and how my interlocutors define their emotions for being an Imam Hatip Highschool student. Throughout the study, the reader would find the

links between military and education, as well as, due to the time period, the reader would find a micro-analysis of left and right discussions and how religion was contested during National Security Courses in Imam Hatip Schools. I argue that classroom as a space was a contested proximity between the military official and veiled students. In addition to this, space and place are embodied, being an imam hatip high school student, both meant an identity for the students and a threat to their self, due to discussions on religion and the state at the time. I hope this mini research becomes a seed in the literature of the topic.

Methodology

I have designed this research to be a mini-ethnographic work whereby it could be a seed for further research. Ethnographic research first and foremost aim to give voice to the voiceless and try to understand the experiences and culture of people. As well as it tries to link the field knowledge to macro analysis. In my study, even though the number of interlocutors are three, I have wanted to conduct mini ethnographic research which I would relate the experiences of Imam Hatip students to the greater discussion on state, military and religion in Republican Turkey. I have conducted in depth interviews with three women. Two of them took the course in 1997 and were educated in Eyüp Imam Hatip Highschool, and one of them took the course in 1996, in Üsküdar Imam Hatip Highschool. I used snowball sampling technique to reach out my interlocutors. Since my main concern is to understand their experiences and perceptions with regards to the National Security Course and the military official, I will use theoretical frameworks on emotions, memory and space. There with the three sample I have, I humbly claim that my interlocutors embodied their experiences through their emotions and memory.

Military, Religion, Imam Hatip Schools: The Historical Background

When one reads about the history of military of Turkey one immediately finds themselves in the center of discourses such as Turkish people even from their nomadic tribal times, was always a militaristic community, it was followed by the Ottoman empire and this view of military and society was carried out to Ottoman Empire. Therefore, we can undoubtedly say that the history of military is not a new concept for the formation of Republican Turkey. It can be viewed as a continuity from the Ottoman Period which the army always enjoyed a privileged status both administratively and socially. For example, in Ottoman Empire “society came to be regarded as divided into two sections: the first, the askeri (military), comprising the army and the bureaucracy, that is, the ruling elite; and the second, the raya, which included all villagers.” (Karpaz, 1970, p. 1656) The military was thought to be the administrative body which preserved the structure of the empire. “The modern army annihilated the Janizaries in 1826 and improved itself by borrowing Western techniques and ideas and by acquiring certain professional characteristics that distinguished it further from the civilian bureaucracy.” (Karpaz, 1970, p. 1657) When we get to the Republican Period, after the World War I, to understand the relation between nation state and military it is crucial to point out the fact that, “it was also former members of the Ottoman officer corps, led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938), who founded the Turkish Republic in 1923.” (Jenkins, 2007, p. 340) Even though Mustafa Kemal insisted and regulated that in order to become a political figure in nation-state administrative structure, a military official had to resign from their service, the recognition of military as one of the important faces of nation state was prevalent. From a speech that Mustafa Kemal gave he asserts that “When speaking of the army, I am speaking of the intelligentsia of the Turkish nation who are the true owners of this country...The Turkish nation...considers its army the guardian of its ideals.” (Tachau & Heper, 1983, p. 20) Historically speaking, attributing such a protector characteristic to

the army, was reflected on the different periods of Turkey with coup d'états and military interventions that took place. I will get to this in a second after we discuss another face of nation-state which is religion.

One of the fundamental faces of the nation states is the 'issue' of religion and how to conceptualize religion on the basis of modern formation. This was much the case for Turkey as well. Republic as devoting itself to secularization and modernization, also necessitated to act upon religion and the institutionalization of religion which the old forms of practices had to be abolished to come up with forms of religion that would not oppose with secular and modern ends. It should be kept in mind that the Republic did not outlaw religion all together, it very much recognized it. But the crucial point here for the nation-state was the question of "which Islam should be practiced and how?" Therefore, nation state in early Republican period had sought ways and tactics to control religion and monopolize it in such a way to sell to society.

The state used two important strategies to meet its end: institutionalization and education. The foundation of Ministry of Religious Affairs can be given as one of the first examples of institutionalization which took place in 1924 to abolish the former tradition. Secondly, education had a primary role in the control of religion and institutionalization of religion. In late Ottoman period, education was so segmented and complex that there was not a single unification of education. There were madrasas which were to teach Islamic sciences, on the other hand there were many different foreign schools, and also there were mektep which taught the positivistic courses alone. So what the republican era did was to bring them under one roof of Law of Unification and Education. As nation-state recognizing the driving force of Islam among the masses in Turkey and realizes the majority of population practicing Islam, abolishing it all together might mean a crisis. Therefore, it was crucial for state to control religion, as well religious education. Accordingly, the forms of religious knowledge are carefully fashioned, legitimized, and distributed through a deliberate course of action to generate a

"state Islam" that minimizes any possibility of jeopardizing the secularist principles." (Pak, 2004, p. 326) "In accordance with Tevhid-i Tedrisat the Dar al Khilafa madrasas (Dar'ul Hilafe), which were present in 29 different locations and were originally reformed madrasas were converted to Imam-Hatip schools." (Aşlamacı & Kaymakcan, 2017, p. 281) Under Ministry of Education these schools were established to educate students for religious affairs employment. The curriculum in Imam-Hatip schools was a mixed one both containing Islamic sciences such as hadith, tafseer, fiqh, qalaam and Arabic, it also included courses such as mathematics, history, literature, geography, philosophy. We can easily say that Imam Hatip Schools were established as a means of providing religious service under modern nation-state's control. But the truth is it underwent many different circumstances from time to time. "All the Imam-Hatip Schools, which were opened in 29 different locations in 1924, were closed by 1930 due to the lack of students." (Aşlamacı & Kaymakcan, 2017, p. 281) But as Turkey went into a multi-party system in the government during mid-1940s, we see how Imam Hatip schools became a need because there were not enough imams to lead prayers. Especially with the coming of Democrat Party to power Imam Hatip schools gained a special interest. "The Democratic Party, on the right of the political spectrum, had promised religious freedom to the masses after the transition to democracy in 1946, and saw Imam Hatip schools as the most suitable project to realize this aim." (Akpınar, 2007, s. 162) Most importantly and interestingly, after Imam Hatip schools and high schools were reopened in 1951, civil population also helped to opening of imam Hatip schools either by social support or with monetary fund. (Aşlamacı & Kaymakcan, 2017, p. 286) according to Mermutlu, the reason why civil population was so eager to help as well as wanted to open Imam Hatip was that they "were the institution which crossed the paths of people who wanted to get urbanized as well as religious." (Mermutlu, 2008, p. 88) Mermutlu, points out to a very crucial fact in his work which is migration and urbanization. "While in 1969 two and in 1970 one Imam Hatip school and in between

1971-1973 no İmam Hatip school was opened, in the year of 1974 the number was twenty-nine, in 1975 seventy, in 1976 seventy-seven, in 1977 eighty-six new Imam Hatip schools were introduced.” (Mermutlu, 2008, p. 89) According to him as urbanization rate increased after the multi-party system, so did the number of Imam Hatip schools.

Now, I want the reader to consider and think about there’s a nation state which was founded by military intellectuals and bureaucratic elites, which always applied the six principles of Republican People’s Party known as Kemalism. With the changing power in parliament, Democrat Party rising to power and many changes from politics, economy, social ways of living changed. Migration occurred from rural areas to urban areas. “From the outset, Menderes had pursued a populist agenda, in which policies were shaped by short-term political advantage” which then in turn resulted with “political instability.” (Jenkins, 2007, p. 339) So, in Turkish political history we face with the first coup that emerged in 1960, it was followed by 1971, and 1980 and also the military “staged a coup by memoranda in 1997 that led to the resignation of the Islamist-led government; and issued an e-memorandum in April 2007 that did not bring any changes in the government.” (Narlı, 2011, p. 215) Now, it is important to note the qualities of military. Why they intervene with the politics in the first place? How could they do it? In each military coup, what military had argued was they will bring order and maintain it for a certain period of time, as well they restore democracy and Mustafa Kemal’s principles. “Over the past 70 years, the Turkish military has consistently regarded itself not only as the guarantor of domestic stability and the guardian of the official ideology of Kemalism but also as the embodiment of the soul of the Turkish nation.” (Jenkins, 2007, p. 339) Military has acted as the watcher of democracy, a body that strived for the sustainability of Kemalism and all the other six principles that Kemalism produces. So, anything that threatened the secular modern nation state, the military would intervene it. As we have argued before, Islam unless it was controlled by the state did not prove any threat to state. But if

there's Islam which symbolically opposes to the modern nation-state ideals, which is not obeying the Islam of the state then, the threat again occurs for nation state. This was much the case when we get to the second half of 1990s.

“In June 1996 the Welfare Party formed a coalition government with the True Path Party (TPP), which held 135 seats, and WP chairman Necmettin Erbakan became Turkey's first avowedly Islamist prime minister (Jenkins, 2007, p. 345) It was seen as the rise of political Islam in Turkey, therefor in military's eye, to restore a balance, to restore the principles of Democracy as well as Mustafa Kemal, they intervened before the country is being dragged into a worse position. The term used was ‘irtica’. Irtica meant backwardness, politically it meant an ideology which would drag the nation state into darkness, one that is opposite of progress and opposite of every principle that Kemalism stood for. So, those years, military body's intervention was to prevent the rise of political Islam, which thought to bring ‘irtica’ to country.

In this complex structure, we can give a basic outline for Imam Hatip schools and their positionality in the political as well as social atmosphere in the face of military interventions. Remember, Imam Hatip schools were founded during the Early Republican era with state's struggle and need to control religion in the face of secularism. Main aim for founding Imam Hatip was to raise imams who would serve under the Ministry of Religious Affairs. However, “the attitude of secularists towards Imam Hatip Highschools started to change in the 1990s.” (Aşlamacı & Kaymakcan, 2017, p. 283) They were also seen one of the nests to grow Islamist youth and hence was a very problematic thing for the nation state, a part of irtica which needs to be taken care of.

In the following discussion bodies, with the information I gathered from my informants, first I will explain the identity of an Imam Hatip student. What did it mean for them at that period to be an Imam Hatip graduate or a student. In the second discussion body I will directly focus on the experiences of Imam Hatip students in

the National Security lecture one that is being taught by the military official. I use the term “contested proximity” to define the interaction between them. Thirdly, in the last discussion body, I try to analyze their affection towards military and military body by showing the circulation and articulation of certain signs as affective.

Being an ‘Imam Hatipli’

When after we have discussed the relations between military, religion, nation state and as well as the historical background of Imam Hatip, it is first and foremost important for us to know the perceptions of women as being an Imam Hatip graduate at that time. Since Imam Hatip schools were always a subject of discussion from secularist as well as conservative segments of society, the way they viewed Imam Hatip is crucial for our analysis.

Two out of three women in my study said that they did not want to go to Imam Hatip schools in the first place. So they went to Imam Hatip schools being forced by their parents and not having another choice.

Hülya said that:

“I graduated from public middle school and did not want to go Imam Hatip. Because I had dreams to study Law School and did not want Imam Hatip at that time. With my mom’s pressure, my mom said, either you go to Imam Hatip School or do not go any other school. There was no other choice for me.”

This was much the case for Gülay as well:

“I mean I did not go to Imam Hatip with my own will, as a matter of fact. I went with the pressure of my family. That year my father veiled me by force. He said either you will go to girls’ vocational high school or to Imam Hatip, pick one of them. I thought so much, cried and got sad because I was a successful student for a reason I did not want to go to

a vocational school. I said to myself if I will be veiled I should be with a group which I will feel comfortable myself. Therefore, I chose Imam Hatip.

Enise on the contrary told me she went with her own preference, and she wanted to go so badly. Whether it is by choice or pressure, it is important to note for that specific era, being an Imam Hatip student was a means of identity formation for the three women. It is important that even though both Gülay and Hülya told me they went to Imam Hatip schools out of pressure, they both said it was one of the most important experiences in their lives. And thinking retrospectively they explained that if they knew before that they would like Imam Hatip school this much, they would choose it in the first place. However, we see how the pressure turned into preference for them which then turned into a part of their identity. As Gülay indicates:

“I would feel this way. At those times it was very proud to say I am Imam Hatip graduate. At those times rightist and leftist differentiation was much, more than today, but when someone feels they are part of a fight, when someone is inside a fight feels stronger. I felt my self vary powerful. As a matter of fact, what the military official did was beyond my caring as the saying goes. It was empowering the person and I studied Imam Hatip happily. And even, being a student in Imam Hatip and being a student in Eyüp Imam Hatip was an exception for me.”

From both of their testimonies Imam Hatip became an identity which they inhabited and embodied in such an environment. Even though in the first instance they did not choose it with their own will it turned out as something they hugged in order to fight against the struggles, they faced as the veiled body. Hülya made a very interesting statement with regards to the identity they inhabit as Imam Hatip student

“In those times, there were people who struggled for the cause and being a person of fight was so beautiful. We, being with people of fight, I mean fighting for something, living for something. When I compare myself with the peers of the time and today, when you give a collective struggle and fight you feel very empowered in the struggle, you see yourself as part of the struggle there’s an injustice made, and we have to prevent the injustice from occurring and we with our veiling and faith being able to say we are present in the society and gave the struggle of this. This empowered us.”

Such an elaborate way to see how people in a collective struggle embody the cause of their struggle. This embodiment was apparent in Hülya’s case with veiling as she saw veiling a part of raising her voice for the injustices that are taken place. And being an Imam Hatip student at the time, meant a lot for them in this sense. The embodiment of struggle was also the embodiment of being an Imam Hatip student which then they became proud of being a part of. It defined who they are and empowered them because they had an aim and a cause in which when being a part of it, empowers them. We can see the classroom of National Security lecture in the same manner. With the embodiment of the cause, veiling and Imam Hatip, my informants report that they were doing the same thing in the class, facing the military body in order to raise their voices but at the same time being bothered from it because the proximity of seeing the military body made them feel frightened. The next part of the paper now takes the experiences of students in Imam Hatip as a part of contested proximity between the military body and the students.

Contested Proximity

Berna Turam in her ethnographic fieldwork of Teşvikiye uses a term “contested primacy”. (Turam, 2013) Here in this study, driving the term from Turam, I will use it to define the classroom which the national security course had taken place. Contested

proximity, considering the analyses of Imam Hatip schools, means then the proximity between the military official and Imam Hatip students one that is defined with imagined or real contestations and clashing with each other but yet they have to be present in the same classroom. Hereby, with the expressions my interlocutors gave, I will try to analyze their discourses on the basis of “contested proximity”. I will try to reveal how both the military official, as well as veiled students responded to each other. What were the tactics both have used. Was there a clash between ideas? While, the military official came to the class and taught the course, were there any contested proximity? And what does this contested proximity tell us about the social political atmosphere at the time as well as will reveal the relation with military, nation state and religion. In Ayşe Gül Altınay’s book, she talks about how politics was free to talk during National Security Courses:

“...The freedom to discuss political issues in class was also raised as one of the defining characteristics of the military course by the students as well. There were conflicting opinions as to whether the officer-teachers were indeed the most qualified to teach these issues, but the lived experience of almost all the students I interviewed was the same: politics was at the center of the military course. Any issue, from the question of whether Abdullah Öcalan should be hung or not to the türban² issue at the universities, was a legitimate discussion topic in this course.” (Altınay, 2004, p. 135)

One of my informants named Hülya, in her forties currently working as a kindergarten teacher, when she first about the subject, she was surprised. First, because she thought I am young to see the National Security myself, which is true, and second, she thought that this subject was not probably studied before. Very much eager to talk

² Veil

about her experiences, stated about the natural course of National Security this way:

“I don’t even remember whether he had taught anything from the National Security subjects. His only concern was to call up a problem and discuss it through the whole class hour.”

Apparently, in Hülya’s explanation we can get a sense of how this space as a class turned into a contested space which made the two different ideas present in the same time and forced them to be side by side. Classroom as a space as much as it became the playground for both of the parties, it was also attained new meaning as to contested proximity. Hülya also made apparent examples of discussions.

“The discussed subjects were always related to Islam; he would criticize everything Islamic. For example, at that time, TGRT was popular as the only Islamic broadcast channel and it told the life stories of saints (evliya). He found this very stupid and amateurish those lives of saints. And when he criticized something related to Islamic, it became a reflex for us to defend it reluctantly because we knew that he was seeing it negatively because it was Islamic, so we felt the need to defend it reluctantly.”

My other informant Gülay, whom was also a student in Eyüp İmam Hatip Highschool in 1997, as well as in the same classroom with Hülya said about the same course:

“I think he did so many talks that are anti-religious. He praised a book called *The Demon’s Verses* (*Şeytan’ın Ayetleri*). He insisted on us to read it. he said do not read only from one side, also read *The Demon’s Verses* but of course I don’t know what it is about, but he was insisting too much. he would find something to provoke us in any case, lecture

hours would pass that way. For example, in the first times when he came he introduced himself, and I remember that, he said “I go to many different schools, you look terrifying this way all of you dark blue dark blue, those children are my flowers and you are my beetles. He would say this about the classes he was in. this saying got into me so much.”

The class as a contested proximity lend itself to sort of an encounter in which two different ideas would run around. However, as informants say it was the military official who provoked them, since the place is a shared one, the contestations occurred from both the students as well as the military official. Hülya’s practices to make military official be bothered proves us this:

“And I would do this. For a couple of times, I have realized this was trite and hence the official was not the person to be feared of anymore. We broke the thing by constantly discussing, the teacher’s bell would ring, and it was a break but the ring bells and friends did not got out from the class, when teachers would come in to start lecturing they would see the girls would keep discussing with the military official. Me as well, while entering the class when I see the military official, I would immediately change the tone of my voice and make sure the Arabic characters would come as right and say: Esselamu Aleyküm ve rahmetullahi ve barakatuhu. He would raise his head, look and say, “Where is this place? Saudi Arabia?” and I would say “Iran Hocam, Iran Iran.”

Now, this is very interesting when we consider the issue in the frame of contested proximity. According to their saying, while it was the military official who teased them, we see how this space turned into a space for contestations and discussions in which both of the parties were able to express themselves through various

maneuvers and tactics. In Hülya's case, the way she used the greeting in Arabic was one way she found out for herself to be present in that contested space. They were able to raise their voices against that fearful body of military, in the contested proximity, as time passed it was no longer something to be feared of but something that could be responded to.

Emotions

Emotions are a crucial part of the individual as well as the social body. Collectively feelings talk on to something and reveal unnoted details about the social phenomena. Taking into consideration of this study, the experiences of veiled women in Imam Hatip schools with what they experienced in National Security Course will reveal much. Because as you might remember on the above, we have defined the classroom as a contested proximity in which the space was defined by its discussions and became a social space. Taking the analysis from there, I believe it is crucial to reflect on the emotions of interlocuters as well as to point out significant factors of memory to understand where does those emotions come from? When asked, they referred to their experiences in National security course as a disturbing experience. As Gülay mentioned: "I was disturbed by his reactions." Now, I would like to use and define emotions as much Sara Ahmed does. In her conceptualization "emotions play a crucial role in the "surfacing" of individual and collective bodies through the way in which emotions circulate between bodies and signs." (Ahmed, 2004, p. 117) Rather than something being scary in itself, it is about the circulation of it, which moves between the bodies and signs. One of the interesting emotional discourses was given by Enise:

"Until the last grade and second semester of high school we did not confront any issues on veiling. There were rumors going around about the presence of National Security course and the graduates before us, told us they struggled a lot in that course. So, we always were scared to take it.

Thinking whether we'll go through the same things and be exposed to same things. What if the teacher fails us from the course and we don't graduate, it would prevent us from graduating, if you'd fail that course, you would not be able to graduate."

Her knowledge about the national security course being scary and frightening comes from the ways in which the knowledge of the course was being circulated among the upper classes as well as the lower classes. A very important distinction we need to make here is the emotion of fear. As Sarah Ahmed elaborately puts forward that "it is the futurity of fear, which makes it possible that the object of fear, rather than arriving, might pass us by. (Ahmed, 2004, p. 125) Now considering the fear of Enise, her fear is toward to the future by not knowing what would happen if he fails them from the course and would it damage their graduation? Another important analysis we can gather is from Hülya's speech with regards to how she came to learn military body as something threatening to Islam and Islamic values.

"There's this thing, in our time there were many meetings of National Security Council. In NSC there would be national security meetings and there was no other thing higher than National Security. General staff.. general staff would decide on everything and in our times students who were fired from military schools or military would become trend and these students would be expelled because either they were praying or one of their family members was veiled. I know it from my brothers very well, they wanted to study for military, they were hardworking, and their grades were very good. But my mom said they would expel my kids from military because we are veiled, and they would not let us be inside the military. For example, at those times, a close family friend to us, their sons got expelled because of veiling.

And these NSC would be very scary. They would gather there those epauleted soldiers, with their stern and grumpy gazes. Even at that time, they tortured Erbakan Hoca a lot. It was terrible, definitely. And when they conducted these meetings in order to fight against ‘irtica’ we would enter to the scene. Their trouble was not to defense the motherland, instead the borders of motherland, their struggle was with irtica and you knew that time, when it is said fight against irtica, it was veiling and religious segment of society.”

It is crucial to see how affective signs stick on to some bodies and was produced over time. This was much the case with Hülya’s speech. The circulation of military as something oppose to religion, is what gives source for her definition as ‘terrible,’ ‘scarry’ for the time period. Because through the circulation of such discourses and stories and through her own eyewitness of the period with NSCs, she knew that her body as a veiled body was something to be fight against, which made her fall into a category of ‘irtica’. Hence, as someone, who does not have any power to turn things around since the national security council had the last say, all of what they did and intend to do was labeled as scary, and terrible. This can be summarized with Ahmed’s understanding; she claims first and foremost a circulating aspect of an affect between objects and signs. “Some signs, that is, increase in affective value as an effect of the movement between signs: the more they circulate, the more affective they become, and the more they appear to “contain” affect.” (Ahmed, 2004, p. 120) This was the issue with how they perceived the event as fearful and hence how they viewed military body as fearful, how they clashed with it inside the class room as a contested proximity comes from here.

Conclusion

Nation state has a very layered formation inside which needs different levels of analysis. In this paper, I have tried to point out the relation between Turkish Republic and military, Turkish Republic and religion as well as the relation between military and religion through the analysis of Imam Hatip schools. Firstly, being formed for the secularist ends of nation state, İmam Hatip schools, later did not enjoy a good position in the face of leftist segment of the society. When coming to 1990s, the rise of political Islam caused an anxiety in the military which resulted with a coup to stop 'irtica' from happening. Among this, the veiled body was seen one of the signifiers of backwardness and Imam Hatip students as both being veiled and being educated in Islamic sciences were considered to be one of the threats.

Getting to my analysis, rather than focusing on to the process of February 28, by focusing on the National Security lecture that was given by a military official those years, I have tried to show the relation between military and the veiled body, as well as the perceptions of Imam Hatip school students. Apparently, even though some of my informants did not go to Imam Hatip schools by their own will, it became one of the parts of their identity since it helped them to bind themselves with the greater cause. It empowered them as they said. And secondly, the classroom which the veiled body and military got together was a contested proximity in which both bodies tried to find tactics to raise their voice against each other. While the military official was humiliating the veiled body, the veiled bodies found a chance to respond to criticisms and found ways to intimidate the military body. Lastly, emotions were a crucial part of this paper. Sticking the sign of 'fearful' to military and military body came from the circulation of events and discourses residing inside the collective memory. Lastly, we can say that embodiment was a crucial factor for the women students of Imam Hatip Highschool, which they felt a representative of the cause they were fighting for. In conclusion, the study by presenting a non-studied issue to the ground made a

good contribution to scholarly works. By focusing on the space and emotion and aspect, this paper presented an ethnographic understanding to the political issues in Turkey that were related to ‘political Islam’ during 1990s.

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CHAPTER IV

The Anatomy of a Revolution in the 100th Anniversary of the Republic: Rethinking on the Ideology of Kemalist Revolution

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Introduction

“Indeed, the legend created about Mustafa Kemal and his revolutions was not created during the seven-century Caliphate and Sultanate period [Ottoman Period]. An interesting thing is that these myth makers set out to destroy so-called legends and destroy superstitions! Those who set out to make rational thought dominant in society produced superstition at a level never seen in any period. Those who set out to destroy idols produced idols at a level never seen in any period. The intellectual of the Republic was making the production and watchmanship of idols!...”² (Başkaya, 2014: 42).

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² Translated by the researcher and italics belong to the researcher.

In the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire, which was described as a “sick man” by Western countries, was a “long-lasting great empire” that ruled for 622 years (see: Çırakman, 2002). The Ottoman Empire entered into a process of disintegration as a result of both the wave of “nationalism” that spread all over the world after the French Revolution and brought an end to powerful empires, and its defeat in the First World War, which it entered by taking sides (see: Kedourie, 1968). The treaties signed with the Entente Powers after the war paved the way for the occupation of the Ottoman territories by other powerful states.

As the Ottoman Empire lost its power and disintegrated, the French advanced towards Çukurova and Adana from the south, while the British occupied the Çanakkale, Samsun, Antep and all the railways and other strategic points in Anatolia. The Italians, on the other hand, landed troops in Antalya in order to seize the lands allocated to them in accordance with the secret agreement (Lewis, 2018: 324-325). On 8 February 1919, the Ottoman capital Istanbul was occupied by the Entente. For the “great empire of the period”, which was literally surrounded from all four sides and lost its capital by being occupied piece by piece, the “bells were ringing for the last time”. The “helplessness” brought about by the post-war defeat was leading the empire to a deadlock and a defenceless surrender to the Entente in every aspect (see: Palmer, 2011; Berger, 2022).³

³ Bernard Lewis explains this “predicament” of the Ottoman Empire and the developments that emerged after this situation in his book *Modern Türkiye'nin Doğuşu* [The Emergence of Modern Turkey] as follows: “In fact, there was little hope. After eight years of almost uninterrupted warfare, the once great Ottoman Empire had fallen on its back in defeat, its capital occupied and its rulers on the run. The country was fragmented, impoverished, depopulated and demoralised. The defeated and disheartened Turkish people seemed ready to accept almost anything the victors could force upon them. Almost all, but not all, for when a Greek army, under the protection of Allied warships, landed in Smyrna in May 1919, the embers of Turkish anger turned into an unquenchable fire. The loss of distant provinces inhabited by foreigners could be tolerated, even the occupation of the capital could be tolerated, because the invaders were the great and victorious powers of the undefeated West. Their troops would sooner or later return to where they came from.

The attempts of the Western states to occupy the Ottoman lands disturbed the people living in Anatolia, and this disturbance increased over time and turned into the National Struggle (Millî Mücadele) under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk⁴. The period of the National Struggle was the first steps towards the birth of a new state. And this struggle ended successfully. After the “inevitable disintegration” of the Ottoman Empire, a new state, the modern Republic of Turkey, was established with the success of the National Struggle (Lewis, 1961; Ahmad, 1993). In 1923, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the Kemalist Revolution not only changed the fate of a nation, but also represented a historical turning point by adopting the ideals of modernisation, secularisation

But to place in the heart of Turkish Anatolia a neighbouring people, formerly subject to them, was a danger and an insult beyond tolerance” (Lewis, 2018: 325-326).

⁴ Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was born in 1881 in Thessaloniki, in a middling home. His grandfather had been a primary school teacher in Thessaloniki. His father had been a civil servant and then a timber merchant. Mustafa Kemal lost his father when he was only seven years old and was raised by his mother. In 1893 he entered the military high school in Thessaloniki, in 1895 he entered the monastery military academy and in 1899 he entered the Harbiye in Istanbul as an infantry student. In 1902, he was assigned to the staff class and graduated as a staff captain in 1905. In 1907, he was promoted to the rank of major and was assigned to the Third Army in Macedonia. In 1910, he travelled to Europe for the first time to participate in French military exercises. He showed remarkable achievements in the Balkan War. In 1915, he was recalled to participate in the war at his own request. In 1915, he was involved in a successful mission against the British attacks on the Bosphorus. This victory, which saved the capital Istanbul from occupation, was one of the rare achievements of the Ottoman Empire in recent times. Therefore, this victory led to Mustafa Kemal’s recognition, promotion and transfer to the Eastern Front to fight. On 27 February 1916, he was appointed to Diyarbakır with the rank of general (pasha). On 5 July 1917, he was appointed as the Seventh Army Commander. In December 1918, the Law Societies of Mudafaa-i Hukuk were established. On 10 August 1920, the Ottoman Empire signed the Treaty of Sèvres with the Allied Powers, the terms of which were very heavy and harsh. In this process, Mustafa Kemal embarked on an intensive work in Samsun on 19 May 1919. He organised congresses in various parts of the country such as Amasya, Sivas and Erzurum (Lewis, 2018: 327-338), and in this way, he initiated and led the national struggle movement (see: Ericson, 2013; Hanioglu, 2017).

and democratisation. However, the “New Republic” was shaped around the ideas of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and the “new order and understanding” that he and his close circle wanted to dominate the society was tried to be developed through various ideological tools of the state (Althusser, 2005; 2006), especially literature, history, art and education (see: Şimşek et al., 2012; Kapluhan, 2012). While the understanding of the Kemalist Revolution was turned into the official ideology of the state, Atatürk was iconised and cultised through various means, especially art (monuments and sculptures, painting, music, theatre) and literature (see: Tekiner, 2010; Keser, 2012; Baydemir, 2016: 54-63; 2017: 53-4).

This cultisation, while protecting Atatürk and the revolution in all respects, at the same time rendered it uncritical. As such, rather than being critical, academic studies have been nothing more than a tool to feed the ideology of the Kemalist Revolution. Undoubtedly, in order to understand the Kemalist Revolutionary ideology, it is necessary to look at the life and deeds of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the pioneer of the Kemalist movement. In this sense, his work *Nutuk* (2017) contains a lot about the ideology of revolution. Afet Inan’s *Atatürk Hakkında Hatıralar ve Belgeler* [*Memories and Documents about Atatürk*] (2009), Niyazi Berkes’ *Atatürk ve Devrimler* [*Atatürk and Revolutions*] (2016), Bernard Lewis’s *Modern Türkiye’nin Doğuşu* [*The Emergence of Modern Turkey*] (2018) also provide us with data in terms of understanding the subject. Researchers such as Eroğlu (2002), Çiler (2003), Kaymaz (2010) also have studies on this subject. However, the studies listed here have not gone beyond being an ideological pillar of the Kemalist understanding of government and Republican elitists.

The fact that Kemalist thought became the official ideology of the state, established a strong hegemony in every field from politics to society and became the dominant force protected it against radical criticism for many years. The first radical criticisms of the ideology of the Kemalist Revolution can be encountered only in the 1970s and later. As the hegemonic power of the republican elitists began to be partially eroded, critical studies began to emerge in this sense. Emin

Türk Eliçin's *Kemalist Devrim İdeolojisi* [Ideology of the Kemalist Revolution] (1970), Fikret Başkaya's *Paradigmanın İflası: Resmî İdeolojinin Eleştirisine Giriş* [Bankruptcy of the Paradigm: An Introduction to the Critique of Official Ideology] (2014) are among the works that address the subject from a critical perspective. In addition, Beriş (2004), Sunar (2004), and İnan (2004) have also partially addressed the subject from a critical perspective in their articles.

First, the TBMM (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi) [Grand National Assembly of Turkey] was opened on 23 April 1920, and then the Republic was proclaimed on 29 October 1923. We are in the year 2023. This year, Turkey celebrated the 100th anniversary of its foundation, i.e. the Republic, with “great enthusiasm”. Therefore, in these days when we are celebrating the 100th anniversary of the Republic, rethinking the Kemalist Revolution may be an opportunity for us to better understand the past and to better construct the future. In this study, we invite you to rethink the ideology of the Kemalist Revolution in the 100th anniversary of the Republic. Because re-evaluating the ideology of the Kemalist Revolution is a necessary step to understand the legacy of 100 years ago and to grasp the social transformations of today. For this reason, this study, which examines the literature by subjecting it to a historical analysis, aims to shed light on the process of the collapse of a state and the construction of a new state on the one hand, and on the other hand, to undertake an examination that can reveal the historical and social background of the Kemalist Revolution ideology on the way to this process, and thus to make an evaluation by rethinking this understanding.

Ideological Foundations of the Kemalist Revolution

The Kemalist Revolution was a revolution that took place at the beginning of the 20th century during the difficult period of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the National Struggle that followed. And the revolution was shaped in such a process. The ideological foundations of this revolution are based on the principles

adopted by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his reformist cadre, in other words the Republican elitist cadre, in order to “integrate the Turkish nation with the modern world and establish an independent nation state”. It was a revolutionary process in which concepts such as westernisation, modernisation, progress, national sovereignty, the will of the people, secularism, national unity and independence, integrity, village institutes, art, literature, language, education, economy, modernisation, modernisation, change of dress and attire came to the fore (see: Dumont, 1984; Aslan & Kayacı, 2013; Giritli, 2019). Let us now look at some of these concepts in detail in order to create a general picture of the Kemalist Revolutionary ideology and thus to understand the basic principles and understanding of this revolution.

The Kemalist revolution ideology was a revolution that highlighted the concepts of “national sovereignty and people’s will” and emphasized the “direct will of the people”. During this period, the principle of “Sovereignty Unconditionally Belongs to the Nation” was frequently emphasized. The Kemalist Revolution adopted a revolution approach in which sovereignty and management were taken from a single person and given to the people. It is a concept of revolution in which sovereignty and management are taken from a single person and given to the people. For this, first of all, the TBMM (Turkish Grand National Assembly) was opened on 23 April 1920, the Sultanate was abolished on 1 November 1922, and the Republic was declared on 29 October 1923.

In addition, the Kemalist Revolution adopted the parliamentary system of government as a form of government in which the will of the people could be represented most effectively. With the proclamation of the Republic, the Grand National Assembly played an important role and the people were allowed to participate in the governance of the country through their elected representatives. Moreover, the Kemalist Revolution carried out important reforms in the field of education in order to enable the people to participate

effectively in political processes. Increasing literacy rates and raising the level of education aimed to enable the people to participate in political processes in a more informed manner. In this context, the Kemalist Revolution's principles of national sovereignty and popular will played an important role in shaping Turkey as a modern republic and laying the foundations for democratic processes. However, as we will discuss in detail later on, these principles have also been criticised and debated over time. Especially during the Single Party rule, were frequently criticised for the limited democratic pluralism.

One of the understandings that reveals the general picture of the Kemalist Revolution is the understanding of secularism. The Kemalist Revolution advocated that religion should not interfere in state affairs and that the state should have a secular structure (see: Yetkin, 2013; Şan, 2014). The understanding of secular state refers to the principle that “the state should be independent from religious authorities and religion should remain a matter of private life of individuals in society”. In this context, the separation of religion and state affairs and the idea of accepting religion as an individual matter were adopted. With the proclamation of the Republic, the influence of religious authorities in state affairs was reduced and the interference of religion in state administration was prevented. With the separation of religion and state affairs, secularisation policies were implemented. The closure of sects, the end of the madrasa system and changes in religious dress codes are important examples of this period. In addition, the Kemalist Revolution also abolished Sharia law by carrying out important reforms in the legal field. In addition, with a reform carried out in 1932, the call to prayer was translated from Arabic to Turkish and it was decided to read it in Turkish in mosques. This initiative of the Kemalist Revolution has been recorded as one of the biggest criticisms received to date (see: Akgün, 1980; Dikici, 2006; Zengin, 2015; Aşar & Kaya, 2017).

One of the important points that should be noted about the Kemalist Revolution is about the steps taken by the Kemalist Revolution regarding women's rights. The Kemalist Revolution

aimed to strengthen women's rights and promote gender equality. For this reason, reforms have been carried out to support women's more active participation in social life. One of these reforms was that women were given the right to vote and be elected in 1934. Women were able to both vote and participate in the elections as candidates in the elections of 1935. In this sense, at a time when women did not have the right to vote and be elected in many states, including some European states, this right was granted to women in Turkey.

In addition, one of the ideological approaches of the Kemalist Revolution was Westernisation and modernisation. In order to realise these ambitions, various steps were taken and some reforms were made. In 1934, the Law on Dress Code was enacted. In addition, before this law, the “Hat Law” was enacted in 1925. With this law, civil servants were obliged to wear a hat, while people other than clergymen were prohibited from wearing clothes that evoke religious and traditional codes such as skullcap, robe and turban. The Kemalist Revolution’s desire for modernisation and Westernisation resulted in a move away from traditional elements. This was because the Kemalist Revolution wanted to strengthen the understanding of a secular state. Moreover, in 1928, the Arabic alphabet was replaced by the Latin alphabet. Thus, a radical revolution in education and language was realised. The Türk Tarih Kurumu (TTK) (Turkish Historical Society) was established in 1931 and the Türk Dil Kurumu (TDK) (Turkish Language Society) in 1932. Thus, efforts were made to create and strengthen national consciousness and national memory.

Another key word for understanding the Kemalist Revolution is Village Institutes (Köy Enstitüleri) and People’s Houses (Halk Evleri). Village Institutes and People’s Houses are one of the most important steps taken during this period. Although Village Institutes and People’s Houses were established in the Republican Era with the aim of modernising villages and providing education in rural areas, these institutes turned into an important instrument for diffusing the ideology of the Kemalist regime in rural areas. In this period, the Kemalist Revolution also shaped the transmission of

culture through the education system (Anık, 2006; Taş, 2015; Akandere & Yılmaz, 2017; Yorulmaz, 2019; Kösece et al. 2021).

The Six Arrows of the Kemalist Revolution

There are six principles that form the basis of the Kemalist Revolution ideology. These principles are: “Republicanism”, which emphasizes that sovereignty belongs to the people; “Nationalism”, which is based on the Turkish nation; “Populism”, which mostly prioritizes national sovereignty; “Laicism”, which states that religion and state affairs should be separate from each other; “Statism”, which puts the state at the center as opposed to private enterprise; and “Revolutionism”, which is based on the understanding that the revolutions made should be adopted and developed in society. These principles, which are also called “Six Arrows” and reflect the Kemalist understanding of the Republic, are also included in the party emblem of the CHP (Republican People’s Party), the party founded by Atatürk (see: Siska, 2017; Ocak, 2019).

These principles, called the “Six Arrows”, were put forward by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk to express the basic ideological principles of the Republic of Turkey. When we analyze these principles, we encounter the anatomy of the ideology of the Kemalist Revolution. These principles constitute the skeleton and the basic backbone of the Kemalist Revolution and the new ideology. The fact that these principles are represented by “arrows” should also be taken into account. Indeed, an arrow starts from a starting point and goes towards infinity. The open ends of the arrows also conveyed the message that the arrows were constantly moving forward. It is possible to list the principles and meanings of these arrows as follows.⁵

⁵ Ocak examines the logo with these arrows in detail. Ocak evaluates each of the Six Arrows in this logo in terms of its relationship with the others, its integrity, its cultural ties and the messages it contains. Through this, Ocak seeks answers to the criticisms of Kemalist economic and cultural policies in the context of democracy. See: (Ocak, 2019).

- ✓ *Republicanism (Cumhuriyetçilik)*: One of the most important principles of the Kemalist Revolution ideology is the principle of Republicanism. This principle means adopting the republic as Turkey's form of government, putting an end to monarchy and emphasizing popular sovereignty. A republic is a system in which the head of state and the rulers are elected. The Kemalist Revolution aimed to replace the monarchical system with a republican system. On October 29, 1923, with the proclamation of the Republic, Turkey's conception of government was determined as a republic. The principle of republicanism advocates that sovereignty belongs unconditionally to the nation (see: Çetinoğlu, 2003; Helvacı, 2014; Kayıran & Metintaş, 2018).
- ✓ *Nationalism (Milliyetçilik)*: The Kemalist Revolution adopted an understanding of nationalism that defended the unity and integrity of the Turkish nation. This is a principle that prevents the highlighting of ethnic and cultural differences and aims to unite the Turkish nation around a common identity (see: Feyzioğlu, 1985; Aydın, 1998; Kantar, 2019; Çetin, 2023).
- ✓ *Laicism (Laiklik)*: One of the most fundamental principles of the Kemalist Revolution is the principle of Laicism. This principle is perhaps the most controversial principle of the Kemalist Revolution. It has been debated from the Republican period until today. Today, it is also at the center of the secular-anti-secular/religious conflict. The principle of Laicism refers to the separation of religion and state affairs, and thus the purification of the state from religious authorities. The principle of Laicism advocates that the state should be independent from religious authorities and that religion should remain a matter of private life. Laicism aims to make Turkey a secular state by preventing the interference of religion in state affairs. The Kemalist Revolutionary

ideology took some important steps in this regard. In 1924, the Caliphate was abolished. In 1928, the article “Islam is the religion of the state” was removed from the Constitution. In 1937, it was included in the Constitution along with other principles (see: Mumcu, 1985; Aldıkaçtı, 2011).

- ✓ *Statism (Devletçilik)*: It is a principle involving state intervention in the economic sphere. Statism aims to use economic resources in a planned manner and to increase the welfare of the society. The principle of statism, which supports state intervention in the economic field, aimed to accelerate industrialization and economic development.⁶
- ✓ *Revolutionism (Devrimcilik)*: This principle is also known as the principle of Reformism. It refers to changes in social, cultural, economic and political fields. This principle supported the process of modernization. The Kemalist Revolution adopted an understanding of revolutionism that aimed at radical changes in the social, cultural and political spheres. Within this framework, a series of reforms were carried out, from the legal system to the educational system. The principle of revolutionism aimed at fundamental changes in the social, cultural and political spheres. The Kemalist Revolution aimed to transform Turkey into a modern nation-state through a series of reforms such as educational reforms, legal changes, dress and language reforms.
- ✓ *Populism (Halkçılık)*: This principle was one of the most important ideologies of the Kemalist Revolution. Therefore, the Kemalist Revolution aimed at social justice, equality and social welfare with the principle of Populism. Thus, with this principle, fair opportunities and resources would be provided

⁶ According to Bernard Lewis, the reason why the Kemalist regime adopted the principle of statism, one of the six principles, was not due to any political or ideological inclination towards the Soviet Union or communism, but purely due to the practical necessities of the time (2018: 383).

to all segments of society (see: Arar, 1963; Giritli, 1991; Yılmaz, 2022).

These Six Arrows, or principles, formed the basis for the reforms and modernization of Turkey's founding period. The Kemalist Revolution aimed to transform Turkey into a modern, secular and democratic nation state. These principles are a reflection of the Kemalist Revolution's effort to "unite" Turkish society and "create a national identity". These Six Arrows, which constitute the general framework of the Kemalist Revolution, have become the basic governance concept of the Republic of Turkey over the past 100 years. With the proclamation of the Republic, the strict adherence of the newly established regime to these principles played an important role in Turkey's modernization and the creation of a new identity (national identity). Later, the ideology of Kemalism was also developed, which refers both to these principles and to the embrace of the leadership and principles of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in general.⁷

Rethinking the Ideology of Kemalist Revolution in the 100th Anniversary of the Republic

As we leave behind the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Republic, there are questions that need to be asked and answered about the Kemalist Revolutionary ideology and some points that need to be thought about. A few questions will be asked about the ideology of the Kemalist Revolution, the general outlines of which are presented above, and some arguments will be put forward through the answers to these questions.

⁷ During the Kemalist Revolution and its aftermath, Atatürk's system of thought evolved into an ideology called Kemalism. This ideology included the adoption of Atatürk's principles, loyalty to him and belief in his revolutions. With the development of this ideology, loyalty to Atatürk's system of thought became an important emphasis for a Turkish citizen.

The first question that needs to be asked and reflected upon concerns “sovereignty belongs unconditionally to the nation” and “rule of the people”. The establishment of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (1920), the abolition of the Sultanate (1922) and the proclamation of the Republic (1923) were a clear indication that power was taken from one person (the sultan) and given to the people. However, were the people adequately represented in the first parliament? Was this transfer of power sufficiently ensured? On April 23, 1920, the opening of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and the subsequent abolition of the Sultanate were steps taken to transition the country from monarchy to democracy. However, this transition was not fully realized.

The sultanate is a form of government in which one person, the sultan, holds all power. After the War of Independence, the abolition of the 622-year-old Ottoman Sultanate and the subsequent proclamation of the Republic, in which sovereignty belonged to the people, went down in history as the first of the most radical decisions of the Kemalist Revolution. It was the first important attempt to abolish the Sultanate, where only one person had a say in governance, and to give the word and power to the nation. But was this attempt fully successful? Looking at this period and some of the practices during this period, it can be clearly seen that it was not fully realized. Because from the opening of the Turkish Grand National Assembly in 1920 and the proclamation of the Republic in 1923 until 1946, there was no transition to multi-party life. For 23 years, a single party had a say in the government. Since a single party (CHP) was dominant in the years in question (1920-1946), this period is also called the “One Party” period. This situation undoubtedly made it difficult for different segments of society to be represented. It prevented the will of the people from being fully reflected in parliament. In 1946, despite the transition to multi-party life, the Single Party era came to an end when the Democratic Party (DP) won the elections in 1950. Therefore, in the first years of the foundation of the republic, sovereignty remained largely in the hands

of the Single Party. From 1923 to 1950, there was a total of 27 years of Single Party hegemony. Moreover, in the first parliament, not all members were elected but some were appointed by bureaucratic appointments. This led to a serious weakness of popular will and the end of democracy.

Another question that needs to be asked and pondered about the ideology of the Kemalist Revolution is actually closely related to the first question mentioned above. Can we explain 23 years of one-party rule with the concept of *democratic monarchy*?

The Early Republican period, also known as the Single Party period (1923-1950), is known as the period of the Kemalist Revolution in Turkey and the early years of the Republic. During this period, the government led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk embarked on significant changes with the aim of “establishing a modern nation state” to replace the Ottoman Empire. However, some of the steps taken during this period and the general atmosphere of this period lead us to characterize it as a period of “democratic monarchy”. In this period, the right of the people to vote was recognized and elections were organized. In this period, there was public participation and the right to vote. This was also a democratic element. However, in this period, the sovereignty of the Single Party was more decisive than the direct sovereignty of the people. In this period, the Kemalist approach to governance marked all areas of the newly established state. The Single Party period, marked by the Kemalist regime, lasted until the DP (Democratic Party) won the elections in 1950 after the transition to multi-party life. During this period of Single-Party rule (1923-1950), the establishment and operation of political parties were restricted and one-party rule dominated all areas. However, during this period of Kemalist revolutions, various steps were also taken to strengthen civil society organizations; however, these civil society organizations were generally organized under the state and worked in accordance with the views of the state. Again, although a certain separation between the legislative and executive branches was attempted to be established during this period, the one-party rule limited the impact

of this separation and created a system in which the executive branch was more dominant. As a result, the Kemalist Revolutionary period reflects a political process with certain democratic elements, but also fits the definition of a *democratic monarchy* with its single party rule and limited political pluralism.

In this context, there is another issue that needs to be asked and rethought about the ideology of the Kemalist Revolution: Kemalist Revolution ideology becoming the official ideology of the state and the appropriation of the National Struggle. Attempts to explain it in accordance with the interests of the new ruling class, rather than appropriating it for the people, led to a perception that the National Struggle was owned by Republican elitists. For this reason, the struggles of people other than Kemalists and Republicans in the War of Independence were mostly obscured. This situation caused a certain group of people to be at the forefront while others remained in the background.

However, one of the questions to be asked about the Kemalist Revolution is related to the “old-new”, “secular-secular-antilaic-religious” conflict. It is generally accepted that the Kemalist Revolution rejected the old and established a new and modern order. However, this is not entirely true. Here we need to ask the following question: Was the “break with the old” for the “construction of the new” fully realized? Was this possible? As mentioned earlier, with the decision of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey on November 1, 1922, the Caliphate and the Sultanate were separated and the Sultanate was abolished. However, the Caliphate was not abolished immediately, but waited for a period of time to pass. Some time later, on March 3, 1924, the Caliphate was also abolished. This intervening period can be interpreted as the preparation of the society for this step. Because the Caliphate was a religious institution and had a historical background. Therefore, it was thought that taking this step might cause serious reactions in the society. In Ottoman Empire the Sultan was also the Caliph. Therefore, the abolition of the Caliphate and the Sultanate marked a radical change in the concept of governance by taking power and administration away

from a single person and giving it to the people, while also taking away the religious power of the former administration with the abolition of the Caliphate. Perhaps this was the first step towards secularism. Because religion was not accepted in state administration. However, when we look at some of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's actions during this period, even though religion was abandoned in terms of the ideological structuring of the state, some needs and practices, such as establishing hegemony in some societies, prevented the immediate discarding of religion. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk often visited religious places and people with religious power, such as sheikhs, aghas and clergymen, or met with them personally to get their opinions on certain issues. Thus, the ideology of the Kemalist revolution was neither a complete "break with religion" nor a complete "break with the old and traditional". At times the Ottoman heritage was ignored and at other times the Ottoman legacy was taken over. Therefore, while Turkey modernized with the Kemalist Revolution, it was not exactly a radical revolution that "broke with the old". Perhaps this was also a result of the social needs of the period. Because it is not possible to change society and social structures immediately and rapidly by separating them from their own history.

Another realistic question to ask about the ideology of the Kemalist Revolution is this: Was the Kemalist Revolution really a democratic revolution that prioritized human rights? In particular, some of the policies implemented during this period show that human rights were not prioritized and, on the contrary, some important rights were violated. In 1924, a law was passed that abolished the Sharia courts and put the legal system on a secular basis. During the Kemalist Revolution, institutions such as madrasas and tekkes, which served as centers of religious education and spiritual instruction, were closed down. Although this step was aimed at preventing the spread of religious teaching outside the control of the state, it was contrary to freedom of religion and conscience, which was also a requirement of the principle of Laicism. In 1934, the Dress Code was enacted. Moreover, before this

law, the “Hat Law” was introduced in 1925. With this law, civil servants were obliged to wear hats, while non-religious persons were prohibited from wearing clothes that evoke religious and traditional codes such as skullcaps, robes and turbans. Normally, Laicism protects the freedom of religious beliefs of individuals and guarantees the neutrality of the state. However, with all these steps, both the principle of Laicism and human rights have been violated.

Despite emphasizing values such as human rights and democracy, rights and freedoms were restricted by enacting various laws that interfered with dress codes. It was as if the new regime decided what the people could and could not wear. Therefore, individual rights and freedoms were severely restricted in this way. These steps clearly show that the Kemalist regime used the law as a tool for its own ambitions. Therefore, it should be emphasized that the Kemalist Revolution was not as democratic and respectful of human rights as it was portrayed. In conclusion, it should be emphasized that the ideology of the Kemalist Revolution used the law as an active “tool of oppression”, just like literature, art and other fields, in order to spread its ideology and establish hegemony. One of the main issues that needs to be rethought in relation to the Kemalist Revolution is the cultization of Atatürk. In 1951, the Law on Crimes Committed Against Atatürk [Atatürk Aleyhine İşlene Suçlar Hakkında Kanun] (popularly known as the Law on the Protection of Atatürk [Atatürk’ü Koruma Kanunu]) was enacted. After a while, the Kemalist Revolution evolved into a process in which the leader became an icon, an idol, untouchable and uncritical. Atatürk, the founding leader, was turned into a cult by the republican elites. This cultization, which started during the Single Party period, has continued, often with increasing frequency, throughout the Republican period, the 100th anniversary of which we have left behind. It is possible to say that this cultization process continues even today. Başkaya said, *“There is probably no other leader in the world whose monument, statue, bust and pictures have been reproduced as much as Mustafa Kemal during his lifetime and after his death. Mustafa Kemal was very fond of having statues and*

monuments made. His first monument was erected in Sarayburnu in 1927. Afterwards, his statues and monuments increased unprecedentedly..." ⁸ (2014: 136). According to Başkaya, the intellectuals of the Republic were obliged to "produce a cult of personality and worship it". "This way was necessary to falsify historical events and distort the truth." There was also a serious "ideological hegemony vacuum". And the intellectuals of the republic were trying to fill this hegemony gap. For this, they created a cult: The Cult of Atatürk (Başkaya, 2014: 136).

The main problematic in this regard is that the cultization is done by people who have adopted this ideology, starting with their own close circle. Emin Türk Eliçin, one of the first scientific critics of Kemalist ideology in Turkey, in his book *Kemalist Devrim İdeolojisi* [*The Ideology of the Kemalist Revolution*] (1970), strikingly states that every revolution has an ideology, but the Kemalist Revolution does not have an ideology. In fact, Eliçin states that the Kemalist ideology is an ideology of "westernization" and "modernization", and in a way, it is built upon an existing ideology. Therefore, Eliçin underlines that the Kemalist Revolution did not create an ideology of its own, and that a revolution without an ideology would not be a revolution - implicitly, the Kemalist Revolution was not a revolution. According to Eliçin, one of the main reasons why the intellectual life in Turkey has not yet reached the desired "real scientific level" is that people have not gotten rid of "the influence of taboos, religious and national beliefs" (Eliçin, 1970: 302). According to him, it is all the more regrettable that these taboos and beliefs were formed in the Kemalist elite, that is, in the circle of Atatürk, the leader who said, "the truest guide in life is science", a realistic and rationalist statement. According to Eliçin, if Atatürk had been sufficiently understood and heard, he would have whispered the following in the ears of the Turkish intellectuals who had attempted to create "a truly original and free intellectual environment for the first time" (1970: 302): "*Never mind that*

⁸ Translated by the researcher and italics belong to the researcher.

*hypocritical politicians have attempted to preserve their place in the hearts of my people through the prohibition of law; as I say, the best guide in life is science, scientific facts. Do not try to please anyone while doing science, criticize me if necessary!”*⁹ (1970: 302).

Conclusion

The Kemalist Revolution involved a series of policy, legal reforms and cultural changes led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. This revolutionary period brought about fundamental changes in Turkey’s modernization process. However, as we reach the 100th anniversary of the Republic, it has become inevitable to question, criticize and re-evaluate some aspects of the ideology of the Kemalist Revolution. In the intervening 100 years, due to the hegemonic power of the Kemalist Revolution, studies that seriously criticize and question this ideology have remained quite scarce in the scientific literature. Therefore, as we leave behind the centennial of the founding of the Republic of Turkey, there is a need to rethink the ideology of the Kemalist Revolution. The centenary of the Republic offers the opportunity to examine not only a period of time, but also a tradition of thought and its evolution, the role of this tradition in transforming society, and the impact of an ideology. The steps taken on the path of revolution and the practices carried out for the “construction of a new national identity” through ideological structuring and their consequences are open to questioning.

Undoubtedly, the Kemalist Revolution was a revolution that shaped Turkey’s destiny at a time when the Ottoman Empire was breathing its last breath and the National Struggle was born and succeeded. It is a revolution whose impact has lasted 100 years in every aspect. Today, the legacy of the Kemalist Revolution is still among the fundamental values of Turkey. Developments such as the principle of secularism, the rule of law, modern standards in

⁹ Translated by the researcher and italics belong to the researcher.

education and economic development have been decisive factors in Turkey's modernization process.

The ideological foundations of the Kemalist Revolution included fundamental concepts and principles such as "national sovereignty", "economic independence", "secularism", "rule of law", "education", "art" and "literature". These principles determined Turkey's steps towards Westernization, modernization, modernization and the construction of a national identity. The principles of Republicanism, Nationalism, Secularism, Secularism, Statism, Populism and Revolutionism formed the backbone of the Kemalist Revolution, which became the "Six Arrows" of the CHP, a political party. The general ideology formed by these six principles gave color to the state and left its mark on the revolutionary period.

In this period of the Kemalist Revolution, reforms in important areas such as law, culture, literature, art, language, etc. were aimed at realizing social transformation on the axis of the existing ideology. The aim of the Kemalist Revolution in these reforms was motivated by motives such as "modernization", "Westernization", "modernization" and "progress". The Kemalist Revolution's desire to integrate Turkish society with the modern world paved the way for the beginning of the process of "building a new identity". In order to "build a new national identity", the Kemalist Revolution resorted to various ideological and repressive apparatuses (see: Doğan, 2008; Çağlayan, 2014). While art forms such as painting, sculpture, theater and music were instruments of ideological dissemination and identity construction, the law was used as an instrument of repression to serve these purposes. During this period, Atatürk monuments and statues were erected everywhere, while Atatürk's paintings were reproduced and distributed. Atatürk and the ideology of revolution were frequently depicted in literary works.

Some reforms, especially in the legal field, restricted human rights and freedoms. For example, with the Hat Law of 1925, civil servants were obliged to wear hats, while people other than the clergy were prohibited from wearing clothes that evoke religious

symbols such as turbans, robes and skullcaps. In this way, the revolutionary ideology, which decided what people could and could not wear, clearly intervened in the area of fundamental freedoms. It was stated that such regulations were intended to strengthen Laicism. However, such regulations were, above all, contrary to the principle of Laicism that the Kemalist Revolution defended. Laicism defends freedom of religion and conscience and emphasizes that the state is obliged to protect the freedom of religion and conscience of the people by remaining neutral in such matters.

Although it was a revolution that emphasized national sovereignty and the will of the people, there was no transition to multi-party life for 27 years from 1923 to 1950 and only one party (Single Party-CHP) ruled the state. This period of very limited democracy and representation was almost reminiscent of a *democratic monarchy*. Therefore, in fact, with this revolution, power was transferred from the sultanate and the Sultan to the Single Party.

However, although it is often stated that the Kemalist Revolution was a “rejection of the old” and a “defender of the new-contemporary” with the desire for modernization, it is understood that this was not exactly the case. At times the Ottoman heritage was rejected and at other times it was embraced. In this sense, the Kemalist Revolution was neither a revolution of “breaking with the old” nor a synthesis of “old and new”. At times it rejected religion, tradition and certain values, and at other times it embraced these values.

Of course, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s role in the War of Independence was undoubtedly important in organizing the people to start the National Struggle and later in the success of the National Struggle and the establishment of the New Turkey. And his leadership role is of course undeniable. However, this was turned into a reason to cultize and iconize him (Atatürk) by the Republican elites, especially his close circle. The cult of Atatürk was irreversibly reinforced by the Republican elites. Atatürk was transformed from a person and leader into a body representing the state. All the teachings

of the new regime were explained through the person of Atatürk. This led to Atatürk being attributed extraordinary qualities and assuming other identities beyond his true identity.

Finally, it should be noted that better understanding the ideology of the Kemalist Revolution and rethinking it is, of course, the subject of much larger studies such as thesis or books. In this study, an attempt was made to create a general framework and perhaps anatomy of the Kemalist Revolution. Such an initiative could also be a source of inspiration for future studies. At least here, some aspects of the Kemalist Revolution that cannot be mentioned can be made the subject of other discussions. Undoubtedly, more studies are needed on this subject. New studies may shed more light on this issue. However, new studies need to evaluate the issue more sensitively and critically. Otherwise, the works to be carried out may face the handicap of becoming a pillar of the Kemalist Revolution ideology. More critical studies are needed on this subject to better understand the Kemalist Revolution ideology and behind the scenes.

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CHAPTER V

Understanding Consumption Culture and Property Crimes of Children in Poverty: A Qualitative Study

Ashhan Burcu ÖZTÜRK ÇIPLAK¹

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Poverty, Underclass and Property Crimes

Current debates on the relationship between poverty and property crime are mostly discussed in the context of new poverty and the underclass. People in poverty who were once part of the working class have become socially and economically marginalized, while demand for labor has declined and precarious employment has increased. A culture of crime is formed by conspicuous patterns of consumption based on individual rivalry according to the logic of the

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market economy (Hall, Winlow, Winlow, and Ancrum, 2013; White and Cunneen, 2006).

A discussion on underclass (Murray, 1990) stress cultural factors to explain underclass phenomena, while others such as Dahrendorf (1987) and Wilson (1990) pinpoint the economic sphere as the basis of the underclass. According to Dressel and Porterfield (2015, 33), the term underclass is 'a segment of working class marginalized through the logic of capital accumulation'. They criticize the homogenization of economically marginalized people, which emphasize social marginalization of those with a significant concern of criminal behaviors. Similarly, Farnworth and others (1994, 37) state that underclass should be regarded as 'a condition of unremitting poverty' rather than behavioral definition.

As it is shown in the panel study (Farnworth et al., 1994), persistent unemployment and underclass status defining lifestyle patterns are more influential than economic definitions of class in the identification of street crimes of youngsters, such as in cases of burglary, pick pocketing, robbery, car theft, gang fights, and drug dealing. Therefore, class issues are considered in relation to cultural issues; social problems usually emerge as reactions against the oppressive social order of post-industrial capitalism. Also, some research (Ostrowsky and Messner, 2005; Passas, 1997) highlight relative deprivation as a real risk factor for property crime motivated by comparisons of the poor whose lives and expectations are constrained by inequalities.

Consumption Culture and Property Crime

Consumption is the main force of post-industrial capitalism, which manipulates consumer demand through a culture of consumerism promoted mainly by media and advertising. Consumption is a social and cultural phenomenon based on the myth of unsatisfied desires rather than satisfaction of needs. Status groups are defined by specific consumption patterns which are expressed in different life styles, tastes and clothing design in the late modernity (Bocock, 2008). Social status and integration can thus be achieved

through the display of prestigious consumption patterns. The values of consumption culture promote opportunism instead of idealism and competition instead of sharing. Fashionable, constantly modified and updated products that seem to age faster than ever boost consumption.

Consumption has replaced the function of labour to achieve social status. The virtues of working life have lost their meaning, and the motivation to work has shifted to the possession and consumption of more goods, characterized by the display of wealth and social recognition. The rise of competitive, narcissistic individualism has destroyed social values, control and integration, along with a decline of chance to better jobs for lower classes (Bauman, 2004; Currie, 2003; Hall et al., 2013; K. L. Hayward, 2008). Consumption culture devalues satisfaction, productivity, confidence, and the ability to do a job well. Instead of these qualities, the hedonism of consumption suggests that it provides excitement and pleasure to the individual.

Hedonism in modern consumerism is accompanied by innovations in industry that cause meaning and pleasure to become interdependent. Consumption has become a constant existential quest to be noticed (Charney, 2012). Social character, based on social imitation and status, is acquired through specific consumption patterns. Veblen (1953, 2013), one of the pioneers of the literature on consumer culture, explains that social status and self-esteem are acquired by imitating consumption patterns of the higher "pecuniary" class. The display of wealth and power serves to emphasize one's importance and gain satisfaction. Imitating the "wealthy leisure class" who don't have to work for a living, through conspicuous consumption confers a higher social value and a sense of differentiation. Bock (2008) also emphasizes the class dimension, arguing that lower classes imitate upper class consumption patterns to distinguish themselves socially.

Marcuse (1969) claims that with the desire for consumption, a second nature' is created to sustain modern capitalism, as the

consumer economy makes people dependent on materials. The endless desire to constantly possess and consume has become a 'biological' need of this second nature. 'Second nature' is an identity based on patterns of consumption as symbolic values are ascribed to certain commodities. Similarly, Baudrillard (1998) and K. L. Hayward and Yar (2006) argue that in late modernity, self-actualization, the expression of identity and self-interest can only be achieved through certain consumption patterns.

Deprivation of goods is not just about commodities, but rather about the sense of identity associated with ostentatious symbols of consumerism. Young people's need to define their identity with strong credentials makes them one of the main targets of consumer incentives (Bauman, 2004; Currie, 2003). Consumer culture is one of the most important foundations for identity formation and a source of prestige for adolescents. Lack of self-confidence and high motivation to be accepted by peers reinforce their needs through fashion, brands, and hightech goods. Consumption symbolism is reflected in consumer fantasies to strengthen self-esteem.

Youth in poverty, however, try to cope with their lives in constrained and repressed ways, which can lead to low self-esteem, feelings of shame and guilt, and subsequently resentment and anger that, as Bauman (2004) notes, lead to new poverty. Their identity is not socially recognized as a source of self-actualization, self-esteem, and dignity that cannot be achieved through work, family heritage, or social capital alone. Young people from the lower class cannot build their social identity based on steady and good jobs, leading to an unwillingness to work and hopeless feelings about prospects.

Moreover, the will to acquire goods motivated by the lure of the market can lead impoverished consumers to illicit gains that can drive individuals into crime, as Currie (2003) notes. Deprivation can lead to alienation from social norms, which can lead them to commit property crimes. K. L. Hayward and Yar (2006, pp. 14-15) also point out that the underclass of the new poor is defined as 'pathological

consumers' who have become a 'dangerous class' while social policies that address poverty and inequality are in decline with neoliberal policies.

Consumption culture increases the desires of children and youth and, in turn, leads to deprivation and feelings of social exclusion (Aksungur, 2006; Novak, 2002; Ridge, 2002). As Bocock (2008) notes, clothing and cell phones are important for youth to make a positive impression and improve their self-image and social status. However, the lack of these goods leads to a sense of deprivation. Moreover, the commodification of public space in urban areas excludes low-income and marginal groups of youth (White and Cunneen, 2006), deepening class divisions.

Regarding Turkey, the rise of the new middle class, defined by a lifestyle based on luxury consumption, social distinction, and individualism, can be observed (Keyder, 2005; Şimşek, 2005). Since the 2000s, the influence of integration into the global economy and rent with urban renewal projects has increased the accumulation of wealth and luxury consumption in major cities. In addition to commercials, TV series showing the admirable lives of the super-rich, the wealth mafia, and landlords have played an influential role in the emergence of consumer culture. Due to the desire for luxury consumption and the pursuit of a better lifestyle, the deprivations for the urban poor are becoming more and more apparent, which greatly affects children.

METHOD

The aim of the study is to explore and interpret the perspectives and experiences of children living in poverty who have engaged in property crimes in the context of consumption culture. To gain a deeper understanding of the experiences and perspectives of juvenile offenders, a qualitative research design was used. Focus group interviews were conducted in prison units, where groups of youth from the same ward were placed together, aiming to provide an environment conducive to rich interaction and the expression of individuals with similar life circumstances, thus capitalizing on the

group dynamics created by the placement of the groups. Ten focus group interviews were conducted with six to eight male inmates each with 58 children who were detained in Ankara Juvenile Detention Center for property offenses. All gave their full consent and agreed to participate in the interviews. The main reason was probably their enthusiasm to talk to anyone who came from outside the prison and showed interest, but also the group dynamics in the wards themselves.

The participants were all boys between the ages of 14 and 18; the average age was 16.6 years. Just sixteen of them had never worked before; the majority had done so for at least some time in low status or temporary occupations, including street work. Most of them resided in Ankara's most underprivileged neighborhoods, which locals refer to as "crime prone," where the living conditions were subpar.

The group interviews began by asking about preferred characteristics as a warm-up exercise. Semi-structured interview questionnaires were then used which included questions about demographic information, their views on poverty, wealth, and inequality, rich people's views on poor people and the use of stolen money or stolen goods. Each interview lasted about an hour and a half. Due to the strict prohibition on the use of recording devices, one of the researchers was responsible for taking notes during the interviews.

Open and axial coding techniques were used to analyze the narratives. The analyses were evaluated utilizing various study findings and debates from the literature before the themes emerged.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Social Exclusion and Consumption Culture

Encounters with "rich people" (who use conspicuous consumption as a symbol of their higher social status) leads to comparisons and a greater sense of segregation and inequality. A

great divide between classes becomes more apparent through consumer culture, which reveals sharp social divisions.

There are many differences between rich and poor. They say, 'rich got cars, why do I not have a car?' We pay rent every month; we pay the expenses of our brothers and sisters. Rich doesn't know anything about these.

Poor live in misery, disgrace. Rich goes to holiday resorts, lives in luxury. But poor sleep on the streets. People who don't have money should work.

The cultural values associated with poverty make people in poverty feel very marginalised, which makes social integration very difficult. Şimşek (2005) states that the poor in Turkey are humiliated by various cultural products in terms of their lifestyle, physical appearance, and accent.

Rich smells perfume, poor smells like shit.

They degrade the poor. They see you as million times below than themselves.

Emulation of Conspicuous Consumption Patterns

Consumerism seems to provide a sense of belonging to important social groups and a reason to have fun. As Veblen (1953, 2013) notes, children seem to be pressured between the needs of their own social status and the needs of the social status of the higher classes. As they mimic the luxurious consumption and lifestyles of the upper classes, their low level of education causes them to focus on pleasure-based gratification rather than making rational efforts to change their own social status. A study conducted by Hall et al. (2013) with juvenile offenders from poor neighbourhoods in the United Kingdom also shows that social symbols are more triggering than the material aspect of consumer goods.

Participants appear to mimic upper-class consumption patterns, ' such as wearing brand name clothing, taking expensive

vacations, indulging in nightclubs, and owning or renting cars, which are considered motivators for property crime.

We spend, I would buy my dope (cannabis). We wander around, rent cars, I have no driving license but it's not the license, it's the person driving the car. There are people we know, we rent from them. Sometimes we nick them. We speed on road to Samsun. I don't go to bars and clubs. Beer, phone credit, new mobiles, they soon release an upper model anyway. Ones we had a holiday in Antalya, stayed in a hotel. When the money runs out, we do it again.

I was ok with my life but when I saw friends with a lot of money, cars and that... When it comes to cars, say no more...

It is discussed that property offenders live in the fantasy of being rich instead of trying to become rich. The main drive for their acts is to obtain the money they need for social escape and recognition (Hall et al., 2013). The following quote expresses that they spend significant amounts of money as if they were rich and that they do not care about money at all.

I go to nightclubs. A whole month's wage is spent in one night.

Research conducted in Turkey also shows that theft is an easy way to earn money for most juvenile offenders (İçli-Guenşen et al., 2010). Since it is unlikely that they will be able to satisfy their needs and desires through work, they try to get money easily through illegal acts.

The poor cannot buy whatever they want, the rich can. The poor try to get it in other ways, 90 percent of the time by stealing. When you are working, you don't get paid well. You need education but you need money for that too. That's why they steal.

When they cannot buy what they want, they sell drugs, steal, and sniff glue...

Consumers cannot be satisfied with goods because the attraction of new and bigger goods creates new desires and

temptations as well as impulsiveness (Bauman, 2004). Therefore, the basic characteristics of consumption culture such as dissatisfaction with what one has, consumption without satisfaction, the desire to always have more, become destructive.

It wasn't because I was skint, I was greedy. I had money in my pocket, but I wanted more. I stole a Hyundai once; my father bought a secondhand Opel. Driving a second-hand car or a brand-new car is different.

The importance that shopping has for the affluent classes may tempt lower-class youth to engage in theft (Bengtsson, 2015; K. L. Hayward, 2008). Dissatisfaction and the urge to own and spend more may be the main motives for property crimes.

We are greedy. When we have one thousand, we say 'why not to have two thousand more?' If we have more, we crave even more.

Pleasure Seeking

Young (1999) notes that poor people do not commit property crimes to achieve an average standard of living; rather, it is the desire to live conspicuously or the desire to flaunt the materials gained, which is a manifestation of hedonism and leisure. He contends that rich people's motivation for property crime also lies not in a guaranteed outlook on life, but in the expansion of their wealth.

We go to Alanya (a touristic place). Grass, alcohol, bars, nightclubs...

I was getting high with pills, sniffing glue. I was spending the money in Kızılay (Ankara's city center). I was shoplifting for my clothing. There are tons of shops there.

Hall et al. (2013) explain this tendency of juvenile offenders as extreme pleasure seeking to escape the banalities of everyday life. Money is easily spent with hedonistic goals to achieve maximum pleasure. Hayward (2008) expresses that shopping becomes a pleasure, self-expression, and status display, while theft and robbery replace shopping and become a kind of job for children. Research

with juvenile offenders has also shown that obtaining branded items, fun, excitement, adventure, and entertainment are important motives for property crime (Ferrell, 2004; Hall et al., 2013; Simoes, Matos, and Batista-Foguet, 2008).

You need to taste the excitement of that. There is only one thing... Money... We want to have money, go around and enjoy ourselves, not work. Money in our pocket, wonder about, this is what we want.

Consumer culture leads to the tendency to make quick money instead of working hard and striving for social status, as Bauman (2004) and Currie (2003) point out.

This guy has been coming here for the third time. Extortion, mugging, extortion... He repents each time he comes and comes again. Jobs are everywhere. For example, get in car washing, lots of money in it. Building work and that...

Participants view crime against property as a form of consumerism, excitement and pleasure. Presdee (2000) points out that property crimes become a form of consumption because they are seen as an escape from responsibility and moral norms, and the perceived pleasure attracts youth.

I had excitement with the police at night, I started shivering when I was caught. They call me stupid because I am here. I don't know; it's adrenalin.

I am enjoying it. I used to have good time in Istiklal Street in Istanbul. I paid for my friend's needs. I didn't give it to my family. They didn't need it but I enjoyed doing it.

Some indicated that they did not use the money they earned for themselves or their families as savings or to overcome their poverty situation. Instead of pursuing long-term goals, they focused on quick consumption and spent their money on pleasure-oriented consumption. Entertainment, alcohol and drugs tended to be the main areas of expenditure.

We create an atmosphere, drink all night when the money runs out, we go home. Get whisky, raki and drink.

When the participants tried to justify their illegal and pleasure spending, they kept saying 'what comes from nowhere goes nowhere'. They pointed out that what they called 'haram income', meaning illegal money in the religious sense, was spent on things that were not accepted by society and brought them no real benefit.

I give what I work and earn. I wouldn't give the money I steal. I work during the day, go on my way at night.

Can you take home illegitimate (haram) money? Illegitimate money goes to drugs. You don't think about saving.

Construction of Masculinity with Consumption

The desire to be attractive to the opposite sex is a very sensitive issue for adolescent boys and becomes a driving force for property crimes (Hall et al., 2013). Participants indicated that girls' attention to their popularity is highly associated with spending money and rummaging around. Cars, as an important status indicator associated with masculinity, are a powerful example of masculine identity being completed through luxury consumption patterns. Therefore, property crime is seen as a type of crime motivated by the desire to be sexually attractive and to express masculinity in a robust manner.

If I have money, in discos three to four girls come around me in a few minutes in disco.

I spent money on girls, rented cars. Girls made us go bust. Went to café, lots of money spent on taxis.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of the study was to comprehend and interpret the perspectives and experiences of children who committed property crimes in the context of consumption culture. The research showed that due to their desperation for a better life through employment or school, they frequently engage in pleasure-seeking

activities that are forced by consumer society to get quick money. Children from lower classes were found at risk of the negative effects of consumer culture because of the need to earn money to keep up with upper class consuming habits. It was possible to interpret the reckless use of stolen funds for drugs and cars as an effort to get away from the limitations and tedium brought on by poverty. So, it appeared that their primary motivations are to make money, buy some posh products to elevate their poor social position, and get joy out of escaping their constrained and discriminatory existence. Moreover, it was discovered that specific consumption patterns and sexual attributions of money were crucial to attracting a partner's attention, which appeared to be a tactic used to reclaim their lost masculinities.

Instead of utilizing opportunities for social mobility through education and employment or opposing inequality by participating in equality initiatives that are thought to be difficult to obtain, social exclusion and deprivation are concentrated on property crimes. Hence, the emphasis is on the wealthier classes rather than the political and economic factors that cause and mitigate inequality. Property crimes therefore appear to be a type of compensatory mechanism for injustices in the disadvantaged areas of big cities under the pressure of the post-industrial age's consumption culture. Property crime has been employed by adolescents to make up for poverty and social marginalization because upward social mobility is prevented by equitable educational, employment, and welfare systems.

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CHAPTER VI

A Scale Development Study on the Effects of Self-Orientalist Discourses on the Religious Attitudes and Behaviors of Young People

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Introduction

Orientalism is that the West puts itself in the center with its knowledge and power, and that defines the East as the other and regards it as a place that needs to be developed and civilized.³ Self-orientalism, on the other hand, is the reading and evaluation of the society and the whole set of values that make up the society, directly by the society itself, with an orientalist perspective.⁴ In this context,

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³ Ensar Nişancı- Halit Burç Aka, “Neo-Oryantalizm ve Orta Doğu’yu Anlamak”, *Yalova Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 5/9 (Ekim 2015), 14.

⁴ Hasan Bülent Kahraman, “İçselleştirilmiş, Açık ve Gizli Oryantalizm ve Kemalizm”,

it emerges as a result of conditioning the vision of the world by the current orientalist view and as a result of explaining its own culture to the West in terms of the West's orientalist discourse and Western value system.⁵ Therefore, the East, which is defined as the other, creates other others within itself, and thus the West is not the only subject in the construct of the East.⁶ Since self-orientalism means the acceptance of the systems shaped by the West by the Easterners, the Oriental not only alienates himself but also marginalizes himself against the society he belongs to. In this case, the Easterner accepts a magical, artificial and self-isolating Western tale.⁷

In the self-orientalist thought, which is under the influence of orientalism, individuals are against their state and society; There are criticisms in various fields such as culture, law, education, politics, technique and religion, and evaluations are made through the lens of orientalism.⁸ This scale aims to measure the self-orientalist thinking of high school students towards the Republic of Turkey and society in cultural, legal, educational, political, technological, etc. fields and to measure the extent of this thought. In the section of cultural self-orientalism, it was aimed to measure the validity of the expressions of orientalism for eastern societies such as rude, aggressive, wild and far from civilization for Turkish society. In the section of legal self-orientalism, it is aimed to measure whether there is self-orientalism against the legal system of the Republic of Turkey and the understanding of justice of the Turkish society. Again, the lack of democracy in Eastern societies, which is a reflection of orientalism, has been tried to be measured in the political self-orientalism section,

Doğu-Batı 2/20 (2002), 166.

⁵ Sean Golden, *Orientalisms in East Asia. A Theoretical Model* (Barcelona: Inter Asia Papers, 2009), 9.

⁶ Arif Dirlik, "Chinese History and the Question of Orientalism", *History and Theory* 35/4 (December 1996), 102.

⁷ Hilmi Yavuz, *Modernleşme, Oryantalizm ve İslam*. (İstanbul: Boyut Kitapları, 1999), 65.

⁸ Eyüp Karabela, *Türkiye’de Sosyal Medyada Self oryantalizm “Twitter ve Instagram Örneği”* (Kayseri: Erciyes Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2022), 60.

whether the idea of being ruled by rude, powerful rulers is reflected in self-orientalism. In the educational, technological and economic self-orientalism sections, the idea that the West, which exists in the thought of orientalism, should be the center of development and that the places that it defines as the East that exists outside of itself, will be thanks to itself and therefore should be taken as a role model, and whether Turkey's development in these areas is accepted or not. It is aimed to measure the level of trust.

1979 Iran Islamic revolution, Palestine issue and 9/11 attack etc. After the events, the idea of orientalism has preserved its originality since the 1980s, but some changes have occurred in this thought. The wide eastern geography, which was the target of orientalism, narrowed and was replaced by eastern societies belonging to the Islamic religion.⁹ In this thought called neo-orientalism, the reason for the backwardness of Eastern societies is seen as the religion of Islam. The reason why Eastern societies are fond of violence, lagging behind the West and not accepting modern political formations lies in the fact that their minds are mixed with Islamic culture.¹⁰

This idea about Islam was also dominant in Orientalism, but neo-orientalism, which has the power of the media, has made this idea widespread and strengthened. In addition, neo-orientalism makes its propaganda by using the societies it marginalized in the spread of these ideas.¹¹ Therefore, in societies belonging to the Islamic religion, especially in Turkey, it is thought that the secularization that has existed since the last periods of the Ottoman Empire has increased due to self-orientalist ideas. In this scale, besides measuring the existence of self-orientalist thoughts of high school youth in various fields, it was also desired to measure how much these thoughts affect their religious attitudes and behaviors. In

⁹ Mohammad Samiei, "Neo-Orientalism? The relationship between the West and Islam in our globalised World", *Taylor & Francis Journals* 31/7 (2010), 1148.

¹⁰ Yahya Sadowski, "The New Orientalism and the Democracy Debate", *Research and Information Project* 183 (July-August 1993), 15.

¹¹ Aka-Nişancı, "Neo-Oryantalizm ve Orta Doğu'yu Anlamak", 15.

addition, due to the fact that the media is the most effective weapon in spreading ideas today and the monopoly of the media by the West facilitates¹² the spread of self-orientalist ideas, it was also desired to measure in which media tools high school students are exposed to more self-orientalist thoughts.

In this context, it is expected to make significant contributions to the field by making the first scale development in the literature by making a reliability analysis in order to determine the reliability level of the scale and its sub-dimensions on the effect of self-orientalist discourses on the religious attitudes and behaviors of young people.

1. METHOD

The aim of this study is to develop the Self-Orientalism Scale to determine the Effect of Self-Orientalist Discourses on the Religious Attitudes and Behaviors of Young People. For this reason, scale development processes were followed methodically.

1.1. Working group

The data of the study to be used in the validity and reliability analyzes of the Self-Orientation Scale were obtained by reaching a total of 244 high school students in Kocaeli Province. Using the Google Forms application, the data collection tools in the study were delivered to the participants and the tools were filled in by the participants. Demographic information of 244 participants is given in the table below.

1.1.1. Distribution of Demographic Information

The distribution of demographic information of the participants was examined by frequency analysis.

¹² Karabela, *Türkiye’de Sosyal Medyada Self oryantalizm*, 50.

Table 1. Demographic Information of Participants

		n	%
Age	15-17	142	58,2
	17-19	102	41,8
	Total	244	100,0
Gender	Woman	118	48,4
	Man	126	51,6
	Total	244	100,0
Grade Level	9	32	13,1
	10	9	3,7
	11	137	56,1
	12	66	27,0
	Total	244	100,0
Mother Education	Primary school	91	37,3
	Middle school	37	15,2
	High school	84	34,4
	University	32	13,1
	Total	244	100,0
Father Education	İlkokul	56	23,0
	Ortaokul	45	18,4
	Lise	79	32,4
	Üniversite	64	26,2
	Total	244	100,0
Income	8500-10000 TL	63	25,8
	10000-15000 TL	50	20,5
	15000-20000 TL	55	22,5
	20000-25000 TL	31	12,7
	25000 TL üzeri	45	18,4
	Total	244	100,0
	No Sibling	12	4,9

Number of siblings	1	66	27,0
	2	91	37,3
	3 and more	75	30,7
	Total	244	100,0

When the distribution by age groups is examined; The rate of people aged 15-17 is 58.2%, the rate of people aged 17-19 is 41.8%. When the distribution by gender is examined, the rate of girls is 48.4% and the rate of boys is 51.6%. Among the participants, the rate of 9th grade students is 13.1%, the rate of 10th grade students is 3.7%, the rate of 11th grade students is 56.1%, and the rate of 12th grade students is 27%. When the distribution by mother's education level is examined, the rate of those whose mothers are primary school graduates is 37.3%, the rate of those who are secondary school graduates is 15.2%, the rate of those who are high school graduates is 34.4%, and the rate of those whose mothers are university graduates is 13.1%. When the distribution by father's education level is examined, the rate of those whose fathers are primary school graduates is 23%, the rate of those who are secondary school graduates is 18.4%, the rate of those who are high school graduates is 32.4%, and the rate of those whose mothers are university graduates is 26.2%. When the distribution according to income status is examined; The rate of those with 8500-10000 TL income is 25.8%, the rate of those with 10000-15000 TL income is 20.5%, the rate of those with 15000-20000 TL income is 22.5%, the rate of those with 20000-25000 TL income is 12.7%, the income is 25000 TL. The rate of those over TL is 18.4%. When the distribution according to the number of siblings is analyzed, the rate of those who do not have siblings is 4.9%, the rate of those with 1 sibling is 27.3%, the rate of those with 2 siblings is 37.3%, the rate of those with 3 or more siblings is 30.7%.

Table 2. School Types of Participants

		n	%
School Types	Vocational and Technical Anatolian High School	53	21,7
	Anatolian Imam Hatip High school	69	28,3
	Anatolian High School	111	45,5
	Science High School	11	4,5
	Vocational and Technical Anatolian High School	244	100,0

When the distribution by school type is examined, the rate of Vocational and Technical Anatolian High School students is 21.7%, the rate of Anatolian Imam Hatip High School students is 28.3%, the rate of Anatolian High School students is 45.5%, and the rate of Science High School students is 4.5%.

1.2. Development of Data Collection Tool

In order to develop the measurement tool, the literature¹³ on self-orientalism was examined and as a result of the examination, an

¹³ Buket Akdemir Dilek, *Avrupa'daki Türkiye Kökenli Yönetmenlerin Aksanlı Sinemasında Self-Oryantalizm: Almanya Örneği* (İstanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Doktora Tezi, 2022)., Bünyamin Bezci- Yusuf Çiftci, "Self Oryantalizm: İçimizdeki Modernite Ve/Veya İçselleştirdiğimiz Modernleşme", *Akademik İncelemeler Dergisi* 7/1 (2012)., Karabela, *Türkiye'de Sosyal Medyada Self oryantalizm "Twitter ve Instagram Örneği"*, Seçil Turan, *Eurimages Destekli Türk Filmlerinin Self Oryantalizm Kavramı Çerçevesinde İncelenmesi: 2014 – 2018* (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2020)., Turgay Yerlikaya, *Oryantalizm: Türk Medyasında Self-Oryantalizm* (İstanbul: Marmara

item pool of 75 items was created. The items in the pool were evaluated by 5 Religious Culture and Moral Knowledge teachers, and as a result of the evaluation, some items in the draft were changed and some items were removed from the draft. As a result of this situation, 66 articles remained in the draft. Then, the final version of the draft was presented to 5 experts. The feedbacks of 3 experts were taken into account, and some items were corrected while others were removed. In its final form, a 38-item draft was formed. For the implementation of the draft version of the scale, permission was obtained from Kocaeli University Social and Human Sciences Scientific Research Ethics Committee. In the study, a pilot application was made to determine the intelligibility of the scale items after obtaining permissions. As a result of the pilot application, the draft scale consisting of 35 items in total with a few minor corrections was delivered to the volunteer participants. As a result of the participants filling out the forms, data collection was carried out. In addition, no information reflecting the identities of the participants was included in the study.

1.3. Processing and Analysis of Data

Before proceeding to the analysis, the data were reviewed again, outliers were discarded and incorrectly entered data were corrected. CFA tried to verify whether the previously determined 8-factor model is a valid structure in the application of the Self-Orientalization Scale.

2. FINDINGS

The psychometric properties of the Self-Orientalism Scale were determined by calculating the confirmatory factor analysis and reliability coefficients.

Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2014).

2.1. Scale Validity and Reliability

In order to determine the reliability levels of the scale developed in the study and its sub-dimensions, reliability analysis was performed and the chronbach alpha coefficient was obtained.

Table 3. Chronbach Alpha Coefficient

	Chronbach Alfa
Total	0,885
Factor 1	0,785
Faktör 2	0,811
Factor 3	0,823
Factor 4	0,845
Factor 5	0,901
Factor 6	0,782
Factor 7	0,887
Factor 8	0,863

According to the coefficients obtained, the lowest is 0.785, and it can be said that the overall scale and its sub-dimensions are highly reliable.

2.1.1. Confirmatory Factor Analysis (DFA)

The level of agreement of the scales with a certain factor structure was examined by confirmatory factor analysis. CFA is an analysis used to determine whether the findings obtained from the data obtained from the participants of the study are compatible with the theoretical structure. In the study, the highest likelihood estimation (maximum likelihood) technique was used.

The ratio of the chi-square statistics obtained as a result of the analysis to the degrees of freedom (χ^2/df) was 2,681; root mean square approximation error (RMSEA) 0.083; The Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) value was 0.926 and the comparative fit index (CFI) value was 0.912. A model's comparative fit index (CFI) and Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) values of 0.90 or higher mean that it has good fit.

The fit indices calculated for the scale are given in the table below.

Table 4. Compliance Index Values of the Scale “The Effect of Self-Orientalist Discourses on the Religious Attitudes and Behaviors of Young People”

Acceptable Fit Indices	Calculated Fit Indices
$\chi^2/\text{sd} < 5$	2,681
GFI > 0.90	0,922
AGFI > 0.90	0,912
CFI > 0.90	0,941
TLI > 0.90	0,926
RMSEA < 0.08	0,083
RMR < 0.08	0,072

The standardized regression coefficients obtained for the scales as a result of confirmatory factor analysis are given in the table below.

Table 5. Regression Coefficients Standardized by Confirmatory Factor Analysis

			Coefficients	Standard Coefficients	S.E.	C.R.	P
s1	<---	Trust in Muslims	1	0,583			
s2	<---	Trust in Muslims	0,359	0,207	0,118	3,053	0,002
s3	<---	Trust in Muslims	3,064	0,966	0,643	4,767	<0,001
s4	<---	Trust in Muslims	0,149	0,039	0,252	0,593	0,043
s5	<---	Cultural Self Orientalism	1	0,357			
s6	<---	Cultural Self Orientalism	2,085	0,573	0,568	3,672	<0,001
s7	<---	Cultural Self Orientalism	0,066	0,029	0,185	0,355	0,023
s8	<---	Cultural Self Orientalism	1,212	0,553	0,331	3,657	<0,001
s9	<---	Legal Self Orientalism	1	0,709			
s10	<---	Legal Self Orientalism	1,323	0,909	0,112	11,828	<0,001
s11	<---	Legal Self Orientalism	0,811	0,601	0,093	8,722	<0,001
s12	<---	Legal Self Orientalism	-0,444	-0,381	0,08	-5,559	<0,001
s13	<---	Educational Dimensional Self-Orientalism	1	0,168			
s14	<---	Educational Dimensional Self-Orientalism	-3,88	-0,655	1,746	-2,222	0,026
s15	<---	Educational Dimensional Self-Orientalism	-4,992	-0,762	2,244	-2,225	0,026
s16	<---	Educational Dimensional	0,039	0,005	0,548	0,07	0,044

		Self-Orientalism					
s17	<---	Self-Orientalism with a Technological-Technological Dimension	1	0,692			
s18	<---	Self-Orientalism with a Technological-Technological Dimension	1,1	0,8	0,096	11,499	<0,001
s19	<---	Self-Orientalism with a Technological-Technological Dimension	1,087	0,791	0,096	11,375	<0,001
s20	<---	Self-Orientalism with a Technological-Technological Dimension	1,237	0,826	0,104	11,839	<0,001
s25	<---	Political Self Orientalism	1	0,605			
s24	<---	Political Self Orientalism	1,174	0,714	0,13	9,04	<0,001
s23	<---	Political Self Orientalism	1,185	0,756	0,126	9,411	<0,001
s22	<---	Political Self Orientalism	1,092	0,709	0,121	8,994	<0,001
s21	<---	Political Self Orientalism	1,292	0,823	0,13	9,957	<0,001
s30	<---	Religious Life	1	0,697			
s29	<---	Religious Life	1,055	0,747	0,095	11,114	<0,001
s28	<---	Religious Life	0,058	0,044	0,087	0,667	0,005
s27	<---	Religious Life	0,075	0,056	0,087	0,855	0,002

s26	<---	Religious Life	0,849	0,627	0,09	9,391	<0,001
s35	<---	Media and Self-Orientalism	1	0,881			
s34	<---	Media and Self-Orientalism	0,933	0,834	0,066	14,042	<0,001
s33	<---	Media and Self-Orientalism	0,662	0,406	0,107	6,203	<0,001
s32	<---	Media and Self-Orientalism	0,934	0,538	0,11	8,51	<0,001
s31	<---	Media and Self-Orientalism	-0,277	-0,172	0,109	-2,527	0,011




Figure 1. Confirmatory Factor Analysis Results for the 8-Factor Model

Conclusion

Self-orientalism, which is self-evaluation by the West's judgments about the East, is under the influence of Eastern societies with the strong influence of the media. Adoption of self-orientalism in eastern societies causes the West to be put in the center and to accept that its own culture, values and religion are the factors that

lead back. The judgments created by the self-orientalist thought for Islam facilitate the dissemination of a lot of information that is not true in the name of Islam through the media. When the Turkish literature is examined, it has been determined that there is no survey study for high school students about self-orientalism. Considering this shortcoming in the literature, a scale of Effects of Self-Orientalist Discourses on Youth's Religious Attitudes and Behaviors was prepared in order to measure the self-orientalist thinking of high school students about their country in the fields of culture, education, law, economy, politics and technology and to measure the effect of this thought on their religious attitudes and behaviors. Data were collected from 244 high school students in order to analyze the validity and reliability of the draft scale consisting of 35 items.

Confirmatory Factor Analysis was used to test whether the eight-factor (Trust in Muslims, Cultural, Legal, Educational, Technical-Technological Dimension, Political, Secularisation, Media) structure of the scale is a valid structure. Based on the literature, when the fit values $\chi^2/sd < 5$; 2,681, GFI > 0.90 ; 0,922, AGFI > 0.90 ; 0,912, CFI > 0.90 ; 0,941, TLI > 0.90 ; 0,926, RMSEA < 0.08 ; 0,083, RMR < 0.08 ; 0.072, RMR, IFI, CFI and GFI fit values showed excellent fit, χ^2/sd , RMSEA, SRMR, NFI, RFI and AGFI fit values were found to be within the acceptable fit values range.

In other words, it can be said that the Self-Orientalism scale shows excellent agreement with eight dimensions in some fit indices and an acceptable level in others. The reliability coefficient of the total and all sub-dimensions of the Self-Orientalism Scale is between .785 and .901. It can be said that the whole scale and its sub-dimensions are reliable since it is sufficient for a Cronbach's Alpha coefficient to be higher than .70 for a measurement tool to be used.

Eight factors (1-Trust in Muslims, 2-Cultural, 3-Legal, 4-Education, 5- Technical-Technological Dimension, 6-Political, 7-Religious Life, 8-Media) was confirmed by Confirmatory Factor Analysis. However, it was determined that the internal consistency coefficients of the scale were high. It was concluded that the scale,

which consists of 35 items and eight sub-dimensions in total, is a valid and reliable measurement tool for determining the self-orientalist levels of adult individuals. Consisting of eight dimensions, the Scale consists of a total of 35 items in a 5-point Likert type without the reverse coded item. The scores that can be obtained from the scale vary between 20-100, and high scores from the scale indicate a high level of self-orientalism. Scoring can be done on eight sub-dimensions as well as on the total score. Based on this result, this scale can be applied to determine the self-orientalist levels of high school students. It can be stated that this scale can be used for data collection in scale development studies. In addition, the data collected in this study were obtained from individuals in the general population. Considering this situation, data from a certain group (eg, adults from different professions, university students, etc.) can be collected and the validity and reliability analyzes of the scale can be made.

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CHAPTER VII

Rural Realism in Federico Garcia Lorca's *Blood Wedding* and J.M. Synge's *Riders to the Sea*

Gökçenaz GAYRET¹

Introduction

Federico Garcia Lorca, the acclaimed playwright of the twentieth century who became a member of Generation of 27 and revitalized the Spanish theatre, and John Millington Synge, the highly esteemed figure of the Irish literary revival, present bare realities of rural Spanish and Irish people through addressing the tension between life and death, relentless nature of customs, the resignation to destiny, and the rigidity of gender roles in their plays, *Blood Wedding* and *Riders to the Sea*. Grew up in the culture of rural Andalusia with traditional ballads, fairy tales, and gypsy stories, Lorca witnessed a period in which realism was the dominant movement in Spain and the leading dramatists of his youth were

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influenced by the vogue of Ibsen. Therefore, his principle is that theatre must not be nourished only by fantasies, must be as real image of life as possible, and must capture the drama of contemporary life. He believes that theatre can be authentic as long as it pursues the rhythms, emotions, sufferings, and struggles of those times. Lorca rejects pure art, namely the idea of art for art's sake. According to him, "the artist must weep and laugh with his people. He must lay aside his bouquet of lilies and plunge to his waist into the mud to help those who are searching for lilies" (quoted in Anderson, 1984). In this regard, Lorca mentions the painful transition of Spanish countryside from kingdom to republic and customs to modernity as well as giving voice to the marginalized groups such as gypsies, women, gay men, and African Americans who were like silhouette and had invisible position in male-dominated life. His plays are based on "the rebuttal of a life slavishly in thrall to social convention" (Delgado, 2008). He has a unique style and incorporates elements of Gypsy culture and Spanish folklore in his works as well as using traditional and avant-garde themes and techniques in his works. Even though he is fascinated by reality, he is also interested in writing lyrical tragedies and strives to let mysticism and imagination embellish the stern hard facts of reality. He defines theatre as poetry which "rises up off the page, becomes human," speaks, shouts, weeps, and despairs and elaborates that "theatre needs for its characters to come on stage dressed in the garb of poetry, and at the same time with their bones and their blood showing through" (quoted in Anderson, 1984). Therefore, he transmutes poetic representation of metaphors, symbols, images, rhythm, and myths into his plays so as to enhance the reality and present dramatic vision of life more artistically and effectively.

After the proclamation of the Spanish Republic, Lorca devotes his all energies to a cultural mission: to carry the greatest classical Spanish plays to the outlying towns. Therefore, Lorca co-founds an itinerant theatre company called *La Barraca* under the sponsorship of the new government with Eduardo Ugarte in order to introduce classical Spanish theatre to the people in the countryside

with the slogan of “theatre for all” (Anderson,1984). The purpose of free travelling theatre is to stimulate the cultural needs of people who do not have any formal education and to release classic Spanish plays from the monopoly of upper classes. However, his national and international reputation as a playwright rests mainly on his rural trilogy of Andalusian tragedies, *Blood Wedding*, *Yerma*, and *The House of Bernarda Alba* in the 1930s. These rural plays give a real picture of the society, present the values and customs, criticize the negative aspects of the society, and reveal the oppressed impulses, instincts, and passions of the rural Spanish people. The main characters in this rural trilogy are women and Lorca shows his “deep concern for the needs of women” through dealing with “the second-class status ascribed to women in his native land” (Klein,1991). However, he not only speaks out for women in the chains of the patriarchy but also gives encouragement to all minorities who are subjugated by the conventions “as well as warning to society of the consequences of keeping any of its members repressed” (Klein, 1991). Lorca also gives minimal details about his characters’ physical appearances because he is keener on sneaking into their passions and minds to depict their strife and motivations. Furthermore, he is intensely interested in his homeland’s folklores and culture and focuses on the theme of honour and social and conventional limitations that subjugate the characters’ individuality and lead them into unfulfilled lives and deep frustration in his tragic plays.

As for John Millington Synge, he is one of the prominent playwrights of Irish revival of drama that and sprouts in Abbey Theatre founded by William Butler Yeats and Lady Gregory in 1904 in order to evoke the profound emotions of Ireland on the stage and revitalize Irish folklore, traditions, and language. After he meets William Butler Yeats in Paris, Yeats suggests him to return to Ireland, go to the Aran Islands where people are left primitive, live as one of the peasants of the Aran Islands, and write about their lives, myths, folktales, superstitions, and faith. Synge takes Yeats’ advice into consideration and travels to the remote Aran Islands so as to

grasp the essence of Irish culture and language by immersing himself in the dialect and nature of the islands. He internalizes the poetic spoken language of the peasants of the Aran Islands and studies their local dialect in order to faithfully produce a realistic rural language in his plays. In addition, Synge fuses imagination into the reality by presenting the nuances of common life of peasants because he believes that “reality of life can be only expressed in the living idiom of an everyday speech” and a true drama can be created with “poetic imagination and a living language” (Benson, 1982). He does not deal with the prevalent nationalist romanticism in contemporary Irish literature and put forward any idea of patriotism. Instead, his ultimate concern is to portray the Irish peasant life, folklore, and dialect in a realistic and poetical manner and to “immortalize the lifestyle of Gaelic culture which was unavoidably doomed to fade away” (Zahra et al., 2017). Living in common with the Aran peasants and fishermen, he carefully observes their ways of lives, funerals, perils, sufferings, hardships, and mannerism; “till(s) virgin soil”; “touch(es) the rough grain of peasant nature”; and witnesses the powerful effects of nature, heavy rains, prolonged storms, and rocky lands on their lives, traditions, and destinies (Bourgeois, 2016). In the Aran Islands, he discovers a bleak, primitive, and mystical island that would inspire him to write *Riders to the Sea* and *The Playboy of the Western World* and significantly contributes to Irish rural realism and the production of peasant plays in Abbey Theatre through portraying the lives of peasants in the Aran Islands in his plays in a stylized peasant dialect.

Rural Realities in Lorca’s *Blood Wedding* and *Riders to the Sea*

The first Andalusian tragedy of Lorca’s rural drama trilogy is *Blood Wedding*, *Bodas de Sangre*, was written in 1932 and staged in March 1933 in Madrid, just three years before Lorca’s death. The tragic play in three acts and seven scenes was inspired by a true-life story occurred in Almeria in 1928 which turned into a blood feud when a bride-to-be fled to the son of the enemy family. In the play based upon blood-soaked story of doomed love and feud, Lorca not

only shows how standards and conventions dominant in rural areas attempt to hold sway over human's emotions for the sake of honour but also holds up passion as a powerful and irresistible force the society can curb. Moreover, he combines realism, fantasy, and lyricism in an innovative way; uses thematically relevant songs, lullabies, stage effects, recurrent images, and symbols; and fuses the Spanish folks, rituals, and traditions into a modern drama so as to present the conflict between passions and social conventions more effectively. Lorca also integrates lyrical patterns in drama's structural design; therefore, there are abundant moments where prose is replaced by verses in *Blood Wedding*. Actually, Lorca's ultimate goal is to make an effective social criticism by using lyric which will stimulate the audience's feelings. In other words, Lorca synthesizes dramatic language with lyric in order to immerse the audience psychologically into the play, reach their consciences, and make them empathize with the characters' misfortunes and the intensity of the repressed emotions because of customs, and "silently sing in answer to the query that lyric puts to memory and emotion" (Silverman, 2009).

Blood Wedding revolves around a long-standing blood feud for the sake of honour and land, a rural life which permits human relationships within social and moral spheres and prohibits and punishes severely any deviation from the socially established behaviours, and ambivalence between a promised marriage and ill-fated true love. The characters of the play are mother of the bridegroom, bridegroom, Leonardo, bride, Leonardo's wife, father of the bride, neighbour, mother-in-law, wedding guests, young girls from the village, maid to the bride, woodcutters, moon, beggar woman, and women in mourning. Bridegroom's Mother, a widow, loses her husband and older son in a feud with the Felix family. She consents to her only living son's marriage arranged between wealthy and landowner families according to customs; however, she still has reservations about her future bride who once had love affair with the son of the Felix family, Leonardo. Bride is also in deep sorrow because she is still in love with her ex-fiancé, Leonardo, although

their love affair is water under the bridge and Leonardo is married with her cousin. During the wedding ceremony, Leonardo and Bride succumb to their feelings and passions and confess to each other that the flame of their love is never extinguished. Bride and Leonardo flee together; however, enraged and scorned Bridegroom pursues them through the thick forest under the light of the moon. The chase ends with a knife duel that results in the death of both Leonardo and Bridegroom. The play ends with the mourning of Bride and Mother for their lost lover, son, and husband.

The main concern of the play is codified systems of sex, honour, and passion and the inability to restructure life due to strict adherence to social mores and codes of honour. In *Blood Wedding*, the rigid adherence to moral and social codes as well as honour sterilizes all characters, and they know their places in the society and act in accordance with societal expectations. Bridegroom inherits a large sum of money from his father and wants to marry Bride in order to honour his mother. Bride knows what her father and society expect from her and consents to marry Bridegroom in spite of her on-going love towards Leonardo. Mother, as a grieving mother and widow, abstracts herself from life as the society expects her and her only concern is her living son. Wife is subordinated by her husband, cares for the baby, and does not speak up against Leonardo even when she feels uncomfortable with her husband's attitudes. Father does not take her daughter's feelings into account and wishes her to marry for economic interests. Customs and conventions entirely dominate and determine their lives, leaving no free will. They are social entities designated according to their societal positions, genders, and roles rather than individuals. As they are unable to reproduce life because of strict adherence to traditional codes of honour and societal norms regarding sexuality, Lorca does not give any proper individual names for his characters except for Leonardo. Leonardo rebels against the role the society assigns to him as a married man with child and frankly expresses that his passions for ex-fiancée are higher than the norms and cannot be kept down as follows:

LEONARDO: To be silent and consumed by fire is the worst punishment on earth, of those we inflict on ourselves. What use was pride to me, not seeing you, and you alone, lying there night after night? None at all! It served to stoke the flames higher! Because one thinks time is a cure, and the walls will shut things out, and it's not true, it's not true. When flames reach the heart, they can't be quenched! (30).

It can be interpreted that Leonardo rebels the society's conventions, does not conform to the restrictive social roles, and follows his passions rather than customs; therefore, he is individualized by a proper name.

Lorca prefers women as pivotal characters to reflect how life, passions, and individuality are tyrannized by customs, societal expectations, and norms in *Blood Wedding*. Putting the woman problem at the centre of the conflict between individualism and traditionalism, he addresses the fact that women are more surrounded and squeezed by social structure rather than men and gives different portraits of women from dominant mother figure to passive wife figure. In the play, "all women suffer in their own hells" and have valid reasons to be frustrated and unhappy (Klein, 1991). For instance, Mother leads a painful and frustrating life as she witnesses the death of her son and husband. In the very beginning of the play, Bridegroom asks her mum for giving him a knife to cut grapes and Mother puts a curse on all knives and spits venom to all lethal weapons as she suffers heavy casualties of blood feud in which she loses her son and husband.

MOTHER: Knives, knives...Curse them all, and the wretch who invented them... And shotguns, and pistols, and little razors, and even hoes and winnowing hook ...I don't know how you can carry a knife about you, or why I have these serpent's teeth in my kitchen (1-2).

Her life is controlled by the tragedy of her beloved husband and son's death and this tragedy fuels three dominant passions for Mother: a fervent hatred and thirst for revenge against the Felix

family, an intense desire to shield her only surviving son from any disaster, and a profound fear of knives (Klein, 1991). She is so obsessed with tragic death of her husband and son that she does not endeavour to leave her grief behind and expresses her endless cycle of sorrow and hatred at every opportunity. As the son asks a knife to cut grapes, the mother is frustrated at how easy a small knife can end the life of a man. According to Mother, knife is not a material object but a sign of death of her family that arouses hate, sorrow, and fear.

Mother is adhered to the strict codes of marriage and honour and embodies all patriarchal customs and codes that oppress women in the play. She obeys the rules of society which is rigidly divided into male and female spheres and is strictly adhered to the patriarchal idea that man belongs to public sphere whereas woman's realm is inside of the house. The following utterances of Mother prove that she internalizes the woman's sphere as private and man's active involvement in public sphere:

MOTHER: I wish you were a woman. You'd not go to the river now, and we would sit and sew (2).

MOTHER: Yes, but have girls. So we can embroider and sew and be tranquil (5).

MOTHER: And daughters! Men are creatures who pass on the wind! They're forced always to deal with weapons. Girls need never set foot in the street (41).

As a traditional woman in Andalusia's rigidly structured society, Mother internalizes the messages she has seen and heard throughout her life; therefore, she idealizes man as a real man if he has physical strength and ability to leave a child every corner as follows: "Your father would take me along. He was of the true race. Good blood. Your grandfather left offspring everywhere. That's what I love. Man, man, harvest, harvest (3)." Father and Grandfather are perfect men because they do what has to be done and satisfy the expectations of the society. That is what Mother likes. In addition, she is anchored in the patriarchal belief that a woman belongs to only

man and woman has to abstract herself from the earthly life and passions if her husband dies:

BRIDEGROOM: I don't know. I think not. A girl needs to take a good look at the man she marries.

MOTHER: Yes? I looked at no one, I looked at your father, and when they killed him I looked at the wall in front of me. One woman for one man, and that's it! (4).

As customs and conventions demand, Mother is in an endless mourning and never dares to beautify her life after her husband's death. She cannot accentuate her personhood and are robbed of her individuality so as to maintain the hegemony of traditions. Under the garb of patriarchal traditions, she is confined in the house, sacrifices herself to her dead husband, and does not live her earthly life after her husband's death; therefore, she is physically alive but spiritually dead. In addition, the gender roles in the society are so steady and Mother internalizes the restrictions of her harsh rural society so deeply that she is conservative and strict about the position of woman in marriage. She defines marriage as "a man, and children, and a two-foot-thick wall against all the rest (20). Marriage becomes a prison for women because they are entrapped by the four walls, their destiny is regulated by the needs of children and husbands, and there is no outlet to act out their own identities and desires. Customs cloister them behind thick walls, generate a culture of silence, and make them establish an oppressed and false identity. It is an oppressive and exploitative arrangement binds women to domesticity. Mother's following advice to her son about marriage and his future wife is another example of her internalization of patriarchal customs:

MOTHER: Try to be affectionate towards your wife. But if she gets a bit above herself, or turns awkward give her a caress that hurts a little, a bite, and then follow it with a gentle kiss. She won't be upset because she'll know you're a man, her master, who gives the orders. I learnt that from your father. And as he's no longer here, I must teach you how to be firm with her (49).

As seen in the utterance, Mother internalizes that man is dominant figure in the family. His word is as precise as law. Therefore, she advises her son to control his wife and justifies man's a degree of violence against his wife in case he can maintain the authority. It is interesting and somewhat paradoxical that the regulations set by patriarchal society are articulated, upheld, and transmitted to the next generation by Mother as a woman. In addition, Mother's advice presents "the process by which the Law of the Father is handed down: not only in the words of a mother to her son, but in the education she has received from her husband and according to which her outlook on life is structured"; however, adhering to this patriarchal conformity, despite its imperfections, foreshadows a tragic end for Mother, her son, Bride, and Leonardo (Bonaddio, 2016).

Another female character victimized by patriarchal conventions in *Blood Wedding* is Wife. She is incarcerated into rigid constructions of gender in marriage. The following dialogue between Wife and her husband, Leonardo, shows that man is bossy and authoritative in marriage:

WIFE: (To Leonardo) What's wrong? What ideas are milling around inside that head of yours? Don't push me off, so, knowing nothing...

LEONARDO: Leave me alone.

WIFE: No. I want you to look at me and tell me.

LEONARDO: I'm off (he rises).

WIFE: Where are you going?

LEONARDO: (Bitterly) Can't you be quiet? (14-15).

Leonardo orders his wife to shout up many times when she tries to understand why her husband is nervous. Wife, like other female characters, cannot share her feelings with her husband. When she tries to express them, she is silenced by either her husband or her mother. There is no space to release her feelings. She is aware of the

fact that she is not the primary focus of her husband and ranks below the son she bore for him; however, she has to be silent and docile. Even though she suffers from being ditched by her husband, she is still attached to her home, fulfilling her duties of marriage imposed on her by customs. The woman's wishes are secondary to her husband. She should still take care of her husband and be attentive to her husband's needs. She should keep silence, stay within the home, perform domestic duties, and give birth to new babies no matter how disregarding and insensitive her husband is. In addition, the woman idealized by the society is seen clearly in Father's following utterances which praise his daughter to her future mother-in-law:

FATHER: What can I say of my girl? She's up at three with the morning star to make breakfast. Never speaks out; is as soft and gentle as wool: she embroiders all sorts of embroidery, and can cut a rope with her teeth (19).

As suggested by the quotation above, what is expected from a woman is to be able to be quiet, keep the house in order, cook and sew well, and stay healthy as well as devoting and binding herself fully to domesticity. She is not only subjugated by socially circumscribed roles but also biologically exploited and manipulated. As Father tells about her daughter, "my daughter is broad-hipped and your son is strong" (41), woman is confined to biologically determined social roles: childbearing and breeding. In addition, Father arranges a marriage based upon economic interest for his daughter and does not take his daughter's emotions and love into account. He is only interested in prospect of merging estates of two families: "What's mine is hers, and what's yours is his. That's why. To see it all joined together! Because to join things is beautiful!" (18).

The play is also centred in the conflict between "the celebration of the socially sanctioned union between Bride and Bridegroom" and "the consummation of an illicit and erotically driven relationship between Bride and Leonardo" as well as

presenting the position of woman in Spanish rural life (Anderson, 1984). Leonardo and Bride break engagement but their hearts still belong to each other even though Leonardo is married, and Bride is about to marry Bridegroom. Bride comes from a bourgeoisie family whereas Leonardo belongs to a working-class family of Felix and the class differences between two lovers seem to end their love affair. Leonardo explains the monetary reason of their separation as follows: “Oh, a pair of oxen and a miserable shack weren’t enough for you. That’s trouble” (29). In contrast to Bride’s relationship based on love with Leonardo, her promised marriage to Bridegroom belonging to a landlord family is socially acceptable. However, passion and societal expectations are collided with each other in the play. Lorca sparks out the conflict between individual needs and societal command with the characters of Leonardo and Bride. Even though Bride surrenders to the norms of society which stifle her voice and passions and degrade her to a docile, submissive, and faithful woman, she screams quietly against the patriarchy and craves for her married love, Leonardo. Bride is rather submissive and dutiful in her dialogues with Mother, Father, and Bridegroom. When Mother asks her whether she is happy or not, she answers “I’m happy. Why I said so, is because I want to be married” (20). While Mother and Bride talk about what marriage is, she says that she knows her duty in the marriage. However, after her father, future mother-in-law, and future husband leave the scene, she does not want to see her marriage gifts, bites her hand in frustration, and cries “Ay!” (22). She contradicts with the obedient attitude she displays, and it is the outburst of feeling she represses in the presence of patriarchy.

According to Spanish tradition, an orange blossom wreath is given to the bride by bridegroom on the wedding day and bride wears it during the wedding ceremony. It symbolizes love, fertility, and love’s abounding happiness. However, Bride is discontented with orange blossom wreath given by Bridegroom because her marriage is not a marriage for love but a marriage for economic interests:

MAID: I'm going to place the orange-blossom here, so that the garland sets off your hair.

BRIDE: (Gazing at herself in the mirror) Give it me. (She takes the orange blossom and looks at it and lowers her head disconsolately)

MAID: What's this?

BRIDE: Leave me alone.

MAID: This is no time for sadness. Give me the blossom. (Bride throws it to the floor). Child! That's tempting fate, throwing your garland on the ground (26).

Bride suffers from her repressed passions towards Leonardo in order to fulfil societal expectations and actually rebels against these expectations through throwing the orange blossom. Her refusal to wear the garland of orange blossom stands for the clash between Bride's desire for true love and the society's traditions and norms about marriage. On her wedding day, Bride is not excited because the man who really excites her is Leonardo, not her future husband. However, when Leonardo visits her and confesses his love to her, Bride attempts to resist her passions towards Leonardo as follows:

BRIDE: A man on horseback can go anywhere and knows how to put pressure on a woman lost in a wasteland. But I have my pride. This is my wedding. And I'll lock myself away with my husband, whom I must love above all other things.

LEONARDO: Pride won't serve you.

...

BRIDE: (Trembling) I must not listen to you. I must not hear your voice. It's as though I drank a bottle of something sweet and lay on a carpet of roses. And I'm dragged down, and know I'm drowning, but I slip backwards (30-31).

As seen in the dialogue above, Bride's passion is in conflict with strict codes of honour and social mores. She cannot decide

whether she must yield to her feelings and go with Leonardo or must act in accordance with social mores she internalizes. Even though her feelings are intense, she cannot determine her own destiny by her free will because of societal expectations. For the sake of pride and honour, she refuses to act on her passions, prefers involuntarily to lead a life in accordance with constraints of customs and traditions, and marries Bridegroom by telling “I want to be your wife, and be alone with you, and hear no voice but yours” (35). This quotation shows that Bride actually tries to protect herself and her honour from her passions for Leonardo even though she seems to devote herself to her husband. Despite all her efforts to suppress her feelings and conform to social norms, she finally surrenders to her passions and runs into the forest with her true love, Leonardo, on her wedding night. Bride’s “belated capitulation to desires, spurring her spontaneous decision to run away with her ex-lover Leonardo on the wedding night itself, unleashes rural society’s harsh system of justice” (Silverman, 2009). The wheel of social punishment starts spinning and an inevitable tragedy is approaching for all.

After Wife announces that her husband elopes with Bride, Mother spits venom, urges everybody to chase Leonardo and Bride, and orders them to shed blood for the sake of honour as follow: “Hunt them! Take every road. The hour of blood is here once more. Both lots of kinfolk. You and yours, I and mine” (51). The code of honour is so demanding that Mother who curses knives and overprotects Bridegroom sends her last remaining hope to a certain death for the sake of vengeance and protection of family’s reputation. In other words, the traditions of family honour and eye for eye revenge dominate their lives so intensely that characters are destined to experience a specific tragedy as a consequence of the codes they wholeheartedly adopt. He will succumb to a bloody fate like his father and brother; however, he is blinded by the desire of shedding blood for the sake of honour and revenge. In the name of honour, Bridegroom chases the fugitive lovers and this adherence to codes of honour and desire to take revenge results in a knife duel in which Leonardo and Bridegroom kill each other. After Leonardo and

Bride run away into the forest at night, the third act opens with Woodcutters' following comments on the impending disaster. Woodcutters justify their love and escape; however, they are also aware of the fact that they are destined to blood once the moon comes out:

FIRST WOODCUTTER: When the moon rises they'll see them.

SECOND WOODCUTTER: They ought to let them go.

FIRST WOODCUTTER: The world is large. There's room for all.

THIRD WOODCUTTER: But they'll kill them.

SECOND WOODCUTTER: They followed their inclination: they were right to flee.

FIRST WOODCUTTER: They tried to deceive themselves, but in the end blood proved stronger.

THIRD WOODCUTTER: Blood!

FIRST WOODCUTTER: They followed the urge of their blood (52).

Lorca uses Woodcutters like a chorus in ancient plays that "orients the spectator's emotions to the tragic events" and "expresses not only their vision of what has happened and what is about to happen but represents a feeling of horror at the inevitability of violence and death" (Anderson, 1974). In addition, in the third act, the play turns from drama to a plane of poetic symbolism. The realistic approach ends, and the play becomes a poetical fantasy. Lorca uses supernatural elements and symbolic characters of Moon and Beggar Woman who represent blood and death. In contrast to Woodcutters, Moon craves for death and hopes that two lovers will be caught and bloodshed will warm him. Therefore, Moon symbolizes blood-thirsty society, acts as an accomplice of death, and

shines bright to show Bridegroom around where Leonardo and Bride run away as follows: “Who’s that hiding! Speak out! No! There’s no escape! I’ll make the horse gleam with a fever of diamond” (56). As for Beggar Woman, she is the death in disguise and makes a deal with Moon to let Bridegroom hunt fugitive lovers as follows:

BEGGARWOMAN: Light their waistcoats, pluck off the buttons, so that later the knives will know the road.

MOON: But let them die slowly. Let the blood seep slow through my fingers, a delicate whisper. Already my ashen valley are stirring they yearn for that fount, its quivering flow!

BEGGARWOMAN: We won’t let them pass the stream! Now silence! (56-57).

Moon lights the way of Bride and Leonardo; Beggar Woman helps Bridegroom and shows the hillside they are descending; Leonardo and Bridegroom kill each other in a knife duel, and Moon and Beggar Woman receive what they want: death and blood.

In the very end of the play, two men fall in knife duel and three women, Bride, Mother, and Wife, are left alone with their tragedies. Even though their blood is not shed, they become the actual victims of the disaster, staying like a dead alive. They express their sorrow, grief, and lamentations after the death of Leonardo and Bridegroom among female neighbours. Bride goes back to tell Mother that her son’s pride and honour are preserved by the death of Leonardo and her purity as a virgin woman: “I am pure and that they’ll bury me without any man having gazed on the whiteness of my breasts” (70). She does not deny her passionate feelings towards Leonardo and defines herself as a woman on fire. However, she insists that she is still pure and virgin when Mother insults him:

MOTHER: She’s not to blame. Nor I! (Sarcastically) Who is then? A fine whore, a light sleeper it is who throw away her orange blossom to seek a corner of the bed warmed by another woman!

BRIDE: No more, no more! Take your revenge; here I am! ...But, what you say is not so! I'm as chaste and pure as a new-born babe. And with the power to prove it. Light a fire. Let's put our hands into its flames; you for your son, I, for my body. You'll be the first to withdraw.

It is interesting that while Bride defences herself, her purity, and obedience to the code of virginity, Mother does not care about her bride's chastity despite the fact that she sends her son to take revenge for the sake of familial honour: "What does your purity matter to me?" (71). Mother has nothing left to restore her life. Her sons and husband are wiped out by codes of honour and vengeance. She suffers from tragic end and expresses her anguish in the following utterance: "Your tears are tears from your eyes, nothing more, but mine will flow when I'm alone, from the soles of my feet from the root, and they'll flow hot as blood" (69). However, as she will not experience the death of her men anymore, she also feels peaceful: "I'll be able to sleep at night, sleep free of the fear of guns and knives. Other women will lean sleepless from their windows, drenched by the rain, to catch sight of their sons' faces. Not I" (69). Even though she internalizes the social codes based on revenge, violence, honour, and blood, she is deeply frustrated by violence inherent in the male's role in society which takes her husband, sons, and hope away from her. In addition, Leonardo's Wife is a widow with unborn child and infant son now. She will experience Mother's fate as a widow. Wife will have no right to maintain a happy life, experience a dead life in the four walls, and be in endless sorrow and mourning after her husband's death as her mother suggests as follows: "To grow old and to weep/ Through the locked door/ Never not dead or alive/ we'll nail shut the windows/ Hide your face in a veil. Your children are yours alone" (67).

As for Synge's one-act play, *Riders to the Sea*, staged in 1904, displays the peasants in the Aran Islands whose piteous lives are conditioned and regulated by the natural forces. The harsh weather conditions combined with the relentless malignity of the sea in the island become a source of an Irish mother's mourning whose

husband and all sons are swallowed by the sea in the play. Set in one of the Aran coasts of Ireland, the plot of play is very simple but enriched by effective use of language and symbols and revolves around the painful life and hopeless struggle of old woman, Maurya, who submits to death after losing all her sons and husband due to the fierceness of the sea. Even though the play seems to be concerned with men riding to the sea and consists of many male names, the only visible male figure is Bartley who reflects the fate of all the Aran men and the pivotal characters are women- Maurya, Cathleen, and Nora- who lead a bleak life, wait for men in a cold sweat, and bury them in agony. By doing so, Synge “inaugurates an Irish national theatre that not only attempted to diminish the stage Irishman, but also initiates the Irishwoman into the drama in a new and significantly vocal way” (Frawley, 2009). Through the rich use of the symbols, Synge vividly draws the picture of the perils of life in the fretted island and all cruelty of the sea including death, drowning, grief, and fate.

The play begins with a scene describing “a cottage kitchen with nets, oil-skins, spinning wheel, some new boards standing by the wall” (2). It can be easily interpreted that this simple setting and the objects hanging on the wall represent the tightly knitted life of Maurya’s family with the sea. In addition, these simple objects represent the significance of the sea as the basic source of sustenance for the islanders. In addition, the sea plays a pivotal but contradictory role in the play as both a source of life and a destructive force. Maurya’s family lives in a remote island, men have to go to the mainland in order to sustain the lives of their families, and the only way to go there is through the sea. In other words, Maurya’s family, like other families in the island, are “geographically sequestered people” (Kearn, 1975), and the sea provides sustenance for them to earn their bread. However, they have to face the coercive power of nature and the tyranny of the sea to lead a life in the island. In the play, the invisible presence of the sea determines the fate of the peasants. It also impersonates death because Maurya loses her sons and husband, who try to go on the sea in order to earn bread, to

relentless waves. In fact, the boards leaning against the wall for making coffin also indicate that Maurya's family is always waiting for imminent death, and it is the protagonist of their lives because their men's destiny depends upon the sea. Maurya remembers the pain of the disasters caused by the sea as follows:

MAURYA: I've had a husband, and a husband's father and six sons in this house - six fine men, though it was a hard birth I had with every one of them and they coming into the world - and some of them were found and some of them were not found, but they're gone now the lot of them (12).

The male members of the family are engaged in a futile battle against uncontrollable forces of nature. They can do nothing without the sea; however, the sea also holds disaster for them. They all battle for survival but are beaten by the harsh waves of the sea. They set out a journey for survival, but it turns out to a journey to their death. Paradoxically, the sea is the route to survival and death for Maurya's family as a both benevolent giver and merciless taker of life.

Cathleen and Nora, daughters of Maurya, takes "a shirt and plain stocking of a drowned man in Donegal" (2) that may belong to their brother, Michael, who has not returned from a journey on the sea for nine days, they worry about the storm because their last living brother, Bartley, intends to go on the sea. As the wind, waves, and rocks determine their fate and their brother's life is threatened by the harsh conditions of weather, they are in desperate situation.

CATHLEEN: Is the sea bad by the white rocks, Nora?

NORA: Middling bad, God help us. There's a great roaring in the west, and it's worse it'll be getting when the tide's turned to the wind (3).

After the death of Michael, Bartley knows that he must take full responsibility of caring of his mother and daughters as the last man of the family. His family needs money, and sailing to Connemara to sell their horses can meet their needs. Therefore, he insists on going to Connemara to sell their horses to maintain their

lives despite the tragedy they had just nine days ago, severe weather conditions, and the impending disaster for himself. Although drowning is a common hazard in the island, neither Maurya nor her daughters do not fiercely try to discourage Bartley from going on a sea voyage. With a sense of fatalism and helpless struggle with the sea, Maurya is passively against her son riding to the sea. When Bartley leaves the home to go to the sea, Maurya does not bless her son but tell dark words behind him:

BARTLEY: I must go now quickly. I'll ride down on the red mare, and the gray ponny'll run behind me...The blessing of God on you. (He goes out)

MAURYA: (Crying out as he is in the door) He's gone now, and God spare us, and we'll not see him again. He's gone now, and when the black night is falling I'll have no son left me in the world.

CATHLEEN: Why wouldn't you give him your blessing and he looking round in the door? Isn't it sorrow enough is on everyone in this house without your sending him out with an unlucky word behind him, and a hard word in his ear? (6).

Maurya refrains from blessing her son because she is aware of the consequences of venturing into the sea under bad weather conditions. Like Mother in *Blood Wedding*, Maurya is grief-stricken and motivated by despair and pessimistic ideas because of her grave experiences with the sea. Maurya's all men are drowned in the sea. She lost her husband and father-in-law, and their bodies were never found; her Patch and Sheamus fell prey to the sea; her Stephen and Shawn lost in a storm in the sea and their bodies were brought to the house together on one plank; and the sea swallowed Michael for nine days. Her knowledge about the tyranny, fierceness, and roughness of the sea is so deep that she knows that it is in vain to bless Bartley and if he is gone, he will die. Maurya embodies the collective experiences of various mothers, wives, and daughters and her grief is actually "a micro and macrocosm of life" on the Aran islands (Krasner, 2012). In addition, the fact that Bartley wears his dead brother's shirt, Nora and Cathleen forget to give him bread, and

Maurya neglects her blessing for her son and sees Michael's ghost behind Bartley actually signals Bartley's impending doom and death. As Durbach (1972) notes, Bartley, like other men, is a "rider to the same unappeasable sea" and his riding will turn into a path to his own death.

When the curtain is close to fall, a crowd approaches to Maurya's house by carrying a wet corpse. A woman whispers to Cathleen that it is Bartley's drowned body, and the horse knocks him into the sea. Maurya looks at her dead son's body and says in a controlled and calm manner:

MAURYA: They're all gone now, and there isn't anything more the sea can do to me...I'll have no call now to be up crying and praying when the wind breaks from the south, and you can hear the surf is in the east, and the surf is in the west, making a great stir with the two noises, and they hitting one on the other. I'll have no call now to be going down and getting Holy Water in the dark nights after Samhain, and I won't care what way the sea is when the other women will be keening...It's a great rest I'll have now, and it's time surely. It's a great rest I'll have now, and great sleeping in the long nights after Samhain, if it's only a bit of wet flour we do have to eat, and maybe a fish that would be stinking (14).

Even though Maurya is expected to screamingly cry, she is in a silent agony and great calm. Throughout her life, she has suffered from her strong maternal feelings because her sons are in perpetual danger on the sea. She has been worn out because of her concerns about the male members of her family. However, all her men are dead now and there is nothing left to worry about. Maurya's woes are now over, and the rough waves of the sea mean nothing to her. After the death of her all sons and husband, she triumphs over the sea because it can harm her no longer. The anguish watching of the sea for the return of men ends for her and this distress is left for other women who still have male members in their families. Like Mother in *Blood Wedding* who longs for sleeping in peace without fear of gunfire or knives as each man in her life passes away, Maurya

is also free of her fears now and attains peace and relief. It's time to rest for her and she can finally sleep comfortably. In the very end of the play, the audience witnesses Maurya's stoic acceptance of fate after sprinkling Holy Water on the dead body of Bartley and blessing her all dead men as follows: "Michael has a clean burial in the far north, by the grace of the Almighty God. Bartley will have a fine coffin out of the white boards, and a deep grave surely. What more can we want than that? No man at all can be living for ever, and we must be satisfied" (15). Maurya submits to the overpowering forces of nature and accepts all the deaths caused by the sea. She calmly accepts that human's destiny is death and her fight with nature is over. Despite the devastating events, the figures of grief-driven mothers in a constant threat of death due to either the pervasive presence of blood feud or the malignity of the sea show resilience and resign to their fate, accepting the inevitability of doom in both plays.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Lorca draws attention to the very realistic and universal issues of the subjugation of women in the society, the repression of passions in accordance with the society's norms, and bloody vengeance for the sake of honour and pride prevailing in rural areas in *Blood Wedding*. Lorca also presents that the strict adherence to codified system of morality and honour distorts human's feelings and passions, prevents humans from asserting individual identities, and leads them into a tragic end. Similarly, Synge puts flesh on the bones of the stern facts of life in the Aran Islands, Irish peasants' helpless struggle against the fierceness of the sea under harsh conditions, and their strong sense of fatalism through drawing a picture of the routine tragedies suffered by Maurya in *Riders to the Sea*. Synge authentically portrays the bare realities of rural Irish people who struggle with sea and soil in Aran islands while contributing a poetic and symbolic dimension to his play.

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